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Typicality arguments attempt to use the Copernican Principle to draw conclusions about the
cosmos and presently unknown conscious beings within it. The most notorious is the Doomsday
Argument, which purports to constrain humanity’s future from its current lifespan alone. These
arguments rest on a likelihood calculation that penalizes models in proportion to the number of
distinguishable observers. I argue that such reasoning leads to solipsism, the belief that one is the
only being in the world, and is therefore unacceptable. Using variants of the “Sleeping Beauty”
thought experiment as a guide, I present a framework for evaluating observations in a large cosmos:
Fine Graining with Auxiliary Indexicals (FGAI). FGAI requires the construction of specific models
of physical outcomes and observations. Valid typicality arguments then emerge from the combina-
torial properties of third-person physical microhypotheses. Indexical (observer-relative) facts do not
directly constrain physical theories. Instead they serve to weight different provisional evaluations of
credence. These weights define a probabilistic reference class of locations. As indexical knowledge
changes, the weights shift. I show that the self-applied Doomsday Argument fails in FGAI, even
though it can work for an external observer. I also discuss how FGAI could handle observations in
large universes with Boltzmann brains.
I. BACKGROUND
What can we learn from the simple fact that we ex-
ist where and when we do? The answer may bear on
many profound questions, including the nature and size
of the cosmos, the existence and types of extraterrestrial
intelligence, and the future of humanity.
Attempts to reason about the cosmos from the fact of
our existence have been called anthropic reasoning [e.g.,
1, 2]. The anthropic principle argues that our existence
is expected even if the events that lead up to it are rare
[3]. In its weakest form, it simply asserts that humanity’s
existence is probabilistically likely in a large enough uni-
verse [4]. The strongest versions of the anthropic princi-
ple have an opposite premise at heart [2]: our existence is
not a fluke, but somehow necessary in a logical sense [5].
Anthropic reasoning has been extended to include Coper-
nican principles, which emphasize the typicality of our
environment. Weak forms point out our evolution was
not a special rupture in the laws of physics, but one pos-
sible outcome that can be repeated if given enough “tri-
als” in sufficiently many cosmic environments like ours.
Strong forms state that conscious beings (“observers”)
like ourselves are common.
Anthropic reasoning frequently tries to synthesize the
anthropic and Copernican principles: we should re-
gard our circumstances as typical of observers like our-
selves. Bostrom [2] has formalized this notion as the
Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA). The group of observers
considered similar enough to us for Copernican reason-
ing to be valid is our “reference class”. It may be as
wide as all possible sentient beings or as narrow as peo-
ple exactly identical to your current self. There is no
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consensus on a single reference class, or indeed whether
we might use a multitude [e.g., 2, 6, 7], although the
more extreme Copernican formulations apply the uni-
versal reference class of all observers. Typicality argu-
ments are often justified in normal experiments to derive
conclusions when unusual outcomes are expected given
enough “trials”. In fact, some kind of typicality assump-
tion seems necessary to reason about large cosmologies,
where thanks to the anthropic principle there will exist
observers like ourselves with certainty even in Universes
distinct from ours – otherwise observations have no power
to constrain the nature of the world [8, 9]. Typicality
is commonly invoked in discussions of cosmology as the
“principle of mediocrity” [10].
The seemingly reasonable Copernican statement of the
SSA has led to controversy, as it can be applied to con-
strain the cosmological contexts of as-of-yet unobserv-
able intelligences in the Universe. Few applications of
the Copernican principle are more contentious than the
Doomsday Argument. In its most popular form as pre-
sented by Gott [11], we are most likely “typical” humans
and therefore are unlikely to be near humanity’s begin-
ning or end [see also 12]. The Bayesian Doomsday Argu-
ment, most strongly defended by Leslie [1], has a more
robust basis: our birthrank (the number of humans be-
fore us) is treated as a uniform random variable drawn
from the set of all birthranks of the final human popula-
tion. A larger human population has more “outcomes”,
resulting in a smaller likelihood of “drawing” your spe-
cific birthrank and a Bayesian shift favoring a short fu-
ture for humanity [see also 2, 13]. A generalized non-
ranked variant has been brought to bear to evaluate the
existence of beings unlike ourselves in some way, as in
the Cosmic Doomsday argument [14].
The Doomsday Argument and similar typicality argu-
ments would have profound implications for many fields.
For example, in the Search for Extraterrestrial Intel-
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ligences [SETI 15] the prevalence of technological so-
cieties is critically dependent on the lifespan of soci-
eties like our own [e.g., 16–18]. Doomsday would be
an extraordinarily powerful argument against prevalent
interstellar travel, much less more exotic possibilities
of astronomical-scale “megastructures” [19, 20]. The
instantaneous population of a galaxy-spanning society
could be ∼ 1020 [11, 14] while predictions of intergalactic
travel and astro-engineering suggest populations greater
than 1050 [21, 22]. Yet the Doomsday Argument applies
huge Bayes Factors against the viability of these possi-
bilities or indeed any long future, essentially closing off
the entire field of SETI as difficult to futile [11]. Similar
Bayesian shifts might drastically cut across theories in
other fields, like landscape hypotheses.
This sheer power cannot be stressed enough. These
likelihood ratios for broad classes of theories (> 1040 in
some cases!) imply more than mere improbability, they
are far more powerful than those resulting from normal
scientific observation. If we have any realistic uncertainty
in such futures, even the slightest possibility of data be-
ing hoaxed or mistaken (say 10−9) results in epistemic
closure. If we discovered a galaxy-spanning society, or if
we made calculations implying that the majority of ob-
servers in the standard cosmology live in realms where
the physical constants are different from ours, then the
evidence would force us to conclude that scientists are en-
gaged in a diabolical worldwide conspiracy to fake these
data. The SSA even can lead to paradoxes where we gain
eerie “retrocausal” influence over the probabilities of past
events by prolonging humanity’s lifespan [23].
Given the unrealistic confidence of the Doomsday Ar-
gument’s assertions, it is not surprising that there have
been many attempts to cut down its power and either
tame or refute typicality [e.g., 2, 6, 24–30]. These include
disputing that our self-observation can be compared to a
uniformly drawn random sampling [24, 26, 30], arguing
for the use of much narrower reference classes [2, 6, 31],
or rejecting the use of a single Bayesian credence distri-
bution [29, 32]. The most common attack is the Self-
Indication Assumption (SIA): if we really are drawn ran-
domly from the set of possible observers, then any given
individual is more likely to exist in a world with a larger
population. The SIA demands that we adopt a prior
in which the credence placed on a hypothesis is directly
proportional to the number of observers in it, which is
then cut down by the SSA using our self-observation
[24, 25, 28, see also Neal 6 for further discussion]. Yet this
prior too posits absurd levels of confidence, not at all like
how we actually reason: we do not actually start out as-
suming a posthuman galactic future is & 1020 times more
likely than one where we go extinct in 2100, and then
update to equal credence upon learning we live in 2021.
Moreover, the SIA leads to the Presumptuous Philoso-
pher problem: the SIA prior leads us to favor cosmologies
where the Universe is large, possibly to a ridiculous de-
gree (say, ∼ 10100) without ever making any observations
[33, 34]. But the Doomsday Argument is a Presumptu-
ous Philosopher problem in spirit too, just in the opposite
direction – one develops extreme certainty about far-off
locations without ever observing them.
In this paper, I critically examine and deconstruct the
Copernican typicality assumptions used in the Doomsday
Argument and present a framework for understanding
them, Fine Graining with Auxiliary Indexicals (FGAI). I
start with an analysis of the self-applied Doomsday Ar-
gument and how it can lead to solipsism (Section II).
Using the “Sleeping Beauty” thought experiment, I il-
lustrate the disanalogy between these arguments and
similar-seeming valid arguments (Section III). I then lay
the groundwork for FGAI by showing how fine-graining
cosmological theories can account for many of the uses for
typicality without making reference to indexical proposi-
tions (Section IV). Section V reintroduces indexical cre-
dences as weights for physical credence distributions. Fi-
nally, I discuss the nature of the Copernican Principle
and summarize why the self-applied Doomsday Argu-
ment fails in FGAI (Section VI).
Throughout this paper, I use the terms “Small” and
“Large” to broadly group theories about unknown ob-
servers [as in 1]. In Small theories, the majority of
actually existing observers are similar to us and make
similar observations of their environment, while Large
theories propose additional, numerically dominant pop-
ulations very dissimilar to us. When specifically talking
about the lifespan of a population, a “Short” history is
one that is Small while a “Long” history is one that is
Large (e.g., Ntotal ≫ 10
11 for human history).
II. THE DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT AND ITS
TERRIBLE CONCLUSION
The Doomsday Argument is arguably the most far-
reaching and contentious of the arguments from typical-
ity. It generates enormous Bayes factors against its Large
models, despite relatively plausible (though still very un-
certain) routes to Large futures. By comparison, we have
no specific theory or forecast implying that inorganic
lifeforms [c.f., 6] or observers living under very different
physical constants elsewhere in a landscape dominate the
observer population by a factor of ≫ 1010. Cases where
we might test typicality of astrophysical environments,
like the habitability of planets around the numerically
dominant red dwarfs [35], generate relatively tame Bayes
factors of ∼ 10–100 that seem plausible (a relatively ex-
treme value being ∼ 104 for habitable planets in elliptical
galaxies from [36, 37]). For this reason, it is worth con-
sidering Doomsday as a stringent test of the “Copernican
Princple”.
Let us consider how the Doomsday Argument works
and the SSA’s role in it.
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A. Noonday, a parable
A student asked their teacher, how many are yet to be
born?
The teacher contemplated, and said: “If the number
yet to be born equaled the number already born, then we
would be in the center of history. Now, remember the
principle of Copernicus: as we are not in the center of
the Universe, we must not be in such a special time. We
must evaluate the p-value of a possible final population as
the fraction of people who would be closer to the center
of history.
“Given that 109 billion humans have been born so
far,” continued the teacher, citing Kaneda and Haub [38],
“The number of humans yet to be born is not between
98 and 119 billion with 95% confidence. There may be
countless trillions yet to be born, or none at all, but if
you truly believe in Copernicus’s wisdom, you must be
sure that the number remaining is not 109 billion.”
And so all who spoke of the future from then on minded
the teacher’s Noonday Argument.
B. Noonday, x-day , and the frequentist Doomsday
Argument
In its popular frequentist form, the Doomsday Argu-
ment asks Wouldn’t it be strange if we happened to live at
the very beginning or end of history? It applies whether
considering the temporal lifespan of humanity, the num-
ber of people ever born, or any other measure zpresent of
how much history has passed so far compared to human-
ity’s total history measure ztotal. Let F ≡ zpresent/ztotal
be the fraction of history that has passed, a value be-
tween 0 and 1. If we regard F as a uniform random
variable, the probability of drawing F closer to 0 or
1 than a value f is p = min(2f, 1 − 2f). We con-
struct a confidence interval with probability p ≡ 1 − p
by bounding our F to be between p/2 and 1 − p/2:
zpresent/(1 − p/2) ≤ ztotal ≤ zpresent/(p/2) with proba-
bility p [11].
This form does not specifically invoke the SSA: F can
parametrize measures like lifespan that have nothing to
do with “observers” and require no reference class. In
fact, it is motivated by an analogy to externally-applied
Doomsday arguments, in which the lifespan of a phe-
nomenon is inferred by making an age measurement of a
randomly selected member of a population [11]. Unlike
the Bayesian Doomsday Argument, it penalizes models
where F = 1 (Section II C).
The parable of the Noonday Argument demonstrates
the weakness of the frequentist Doomsday Argument: it
is not the only confidence interval we can draw. The
Noonday Argument gives another, one arguably even
more motivated by the Copernican notion of us not be-
ing in the “center” [c.f., 27]. An infinite or zero future is
maximally compatible with the Noonday Argument. But
there is no reason to stop with Noonday either. Wouldn’t
it be strange if our f happened to be a simple fraction
like 1/3, or some other mathematically significant quan-
tity like 1/e? Or if we pick a random number from [0, 1]
with the aid of, say, radioactive decay, surely that cannot
predict our future by being unusually close to our f?
Doomsday and Noonday are just two members of a
broad class of x-day Arguments. Given any x in the
range [0, 1], the x-day Argument is the observation that
it is extremely unlikely that a randomly drawn F will
just happen to lie very near x. To handle edge cases, we
regard the interval [0,1] as cyclic, just like the frequen-
tist Doomsday Arugment. The x-day confidence inter-
val with confidence level p = 1 − p is [zpresent/(x + (1 −
p/2)), zpresent/(x+p/2)] if x ≤ p/2, [zpresent, zpresent/(x+
p/2)] ∪ [zpresent/(x − p/2),∞) if p/2 < x < 1 − p/2, or
[zpresent/(x−p/2), zpresent/(x+(1−p/2))] if 1−p/2 ≤ x.
The Doomsday Argument is simply the 0-day Argument
and the 1-day Argument, whereas the Noonday Argu-
ment is the ½-day Argument.
By construction, all frequentist x-day Arguments are
equally valid frequentist statements if zpresent truly is a
random variate with a uniform distribution. Any notion
that being near the beginning, the end, or the center is
“strange” is just a subjective impression, one that has
no bearing on these constructions. The confidence inter-
vals are disjoint but their union covers the entire range
of possibilities, with an equal density for any p covering
any zpresent value [27]. In fact, one can generalize the x-
day argument to all kinds of confidence intervals – there
is no reason we could not construct one for any measure-
ment by “excluding” a small range of values closest to a
measurement.
The Noonday Argument demonstrates that not every
plausible-sounding Copernican argument is useful, even
when technically correct. A proper Doomsday-style Ar-
gument therefore requires something more than the prob-
ability of being near a “special” time. When dealing
with continuously varying parameters and a continuous
likelihood function, any specific parameter value can be
excluded simply by changing the bounds of integration.
Confidence intervals merely summarize the effects of like-
lihood – which is small for Large models, as reflected by
the relative compactness of the 0/1-day intervals.
C. Bayesian Doomsday and Bayesian Noonday
Bayesian statistics is a model of how our levels of belief,
or credences, are treated as probabilities conditionalized
by observations. We have a set of some models we wish to
constrain, and we start with some prior credence distri-
bution over them. The choice of prior is subjective, but a
useful prior when considering a single discrete parameter
λ of unknown scale is the flat log prior: P prior(λ) ∝ 1/λ.
This credence distribution is then modified in proportion
to the likelihood L(λi|D) of the observed data D in each
model λi, which is simply the probability P (D|λi) in
that model that we observe y. Bayes’ theorem then gives
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us a posterior credence distribution, with an updated cre-







where Λ is the set of possible λ.1
Bayesian probability provides a more robust basis for
the Doomsday Argument, and an understanding of how
it supposedly works. In the Bayesian Doomsday argu-
ment, the parameter we seek to constrain is the final
total population of humanity and its inheritors, Ntotal,
using birthranks as the observable. The key assumption
is to apply the SSA with all of humanity and its inheritors
as our reference class. If we view ourselves as randomly
selected, our birth rank Npast is drawn from a uniform
distribution over [0,Ntotal − 1], with a likelihood of 0 if
Ntotal < Npast and 1/Ntotal if Ntotal ≥ Npast. Start-
ing from the uninformative flat prior P prior(Ntotal) ∝




0 (Ntotal < Npast)
1/N2total (Ntotal ≥ Npast).
. (2)
The posterior in equation 2 is strongly biased against
Large models, with P pos(Ntotal ≥ N) ≈ Npast/N .
Birthrank is indeed the most natural basis for the
Doomsday Argument, and thus the Argument depends
on observers (or observer-moments). Birthrank is nec-
essarily distributed uniformly. In contrast, age mea-
surements are likely to be biased – in an exponentially
growing population, for example, most measurements are
made by people living near the end. This emphasizes the
role of the SSA.
The parable’s trick of excluding Ntotal values near
2Npast is irrelevant here. Bayesian statistics does de-
fine credible intervals containing a fraction p of poste-
rior credence and we could draw Noonday-like intervals
that include Large models but exclude a narrow range of
Small models. But this is simply sleight-of-hand, using
well-chosen integration bounds to hide the fundamental
issue that P pos(Ntotal ≫ Npast) ≪ 1.
But could there be a deeper x-day Argument beyond
simply choosing different credible intervals? Perhaps
not in our world, but we can construct a thought ex-
periment where there is one. Define an x-ranking as
Nx = Npast − xNtotal; allowed values are in the range of
[−xNtotal, (1−x)Ntotal]. If through some quirk of physics
we only knew our Nx
2, we would treat Nx as a uni-
form random variable, calculate likelihoods proportional
1 Bayes’ theorem can be adapted to continuous parameters by re-
placing P prior and P pos with probability distributions and the
sum in the denominator with an integral over all possible param-
eter values.
2 Neal [6] briefly discusses a case related to x = 1, with a deathrank
motivated by a hypothetical asteroid impact.
to 1/Ntotal and derive a posterior of 1/N
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total for allowed
values of Ntotal (Ntotal ≥ −Nx/x and Nx < 0 or Ntotal ≥
Nx/(1 − x) and Nx > 0). Thus all Bayesian x-day Ar-
guments rule out Large worlds, including the Bayesian
Noonday Argument, even though the parable’s Noonday
Argument implies we should be perfectly fine with an in-
finite history. This is true even if x is not “special” at
all: most of the x-day Arguments are perfectly consistent
with a location in the beginning, the middle, or the end
of history – anything is better than having f ≈ x, even if
the maximum likelihood is for a “special” location. For
example, the Bayesian Doomsday Argument, which uses
our 0-ranking, predicts a maximum likelihood for us be-
ing at the very end of history. The oddity is also clear
if we knew a cyclic Noonday rank N ′1/2 that wraps from
the last to the first human: the most likely Ntotal value
would be N ′1/2 + 1, a seemingly anti-Copernican conclu-
sion favoring us being adjacent to the center of history.
The Bayesian x-day Arguments provide insight into
the heart of the Bayesian Doomsday Argument, which
has nothing to do with the beginning, middle, or end of
history being “special”. What powers all of these argu-
ments is the SSA applied with a broad reference class:
the 1/Ntotal factor in the likelihood. According to these
SSA-based arguments, the reason Large worlds are un-
likely is because measuring any particular value of Nx
whatsoever is more unlikely as Ntotal increases. This is a
generic property when one actually is randomly drawing
from a population; it does not even depend on numerical
rankings at all. Ultimately, the result follows from the
Bayesian Occam’s Razor effect, in which Bayesian proba-
bility punishes hypotheses with many possible outcomes
[39].
D. The Presumptuous Solipsist
The SSA is doing all of the work in the x-day Ar-
guments, but nothing restricts its applications solely to
birth rankings or Nx in general. In fact, the unrestricted
SSA argues against Large models of all kinds. It can be
used to derive “constraints” on all kinds of intelligences.
One example is the Cosmic Doomsday argument against
the existence of interstellar societies, solely by virtue of
their large populations regardless of any birthrank [14]. If
thoroughly applied, however, it would lead to shockingly
strong evidence on a variety of matters, from cosmology
to astrobiology to psychology [as noted by 6, 40].
The existence of non-human observers is widely de-
bated. Several theories of physics predict a universe with
infinite extent (in space, time, or otherwise), including
the open and flat universes of conventional cosmology,
eternal inflation, cyclic cosmology, and the many-world
interpretation of quantum mechanics.3 In each of these
3 In fact, Leslie [41] does use the Doomsday argument to reject
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models, every possible observer is almost surely realized,
with a nearly endless panoply of Earths at least slightly
different from ours. But according to the unrestricted
SSA, the probability that a randomly selected observer
would find themselves in this version of Earth might as
well be zero in a sufficiently big universe. The unre-
stricted SSA also rules out the existence that most of the
Universe’s sentient population is not humanlike in some
way, like having a non-carbon based biology or living in
the sea. In fact it obliterates the case for SETI even
without the Doomsday Argument, for if many aliens ex-
isted in the Universe, what would the probability be of
being born a human instead any of the panoply of ex-
traterrestrial species that are out there?4 It also makes
short work of the question of the question of animal con-
sciousness. Isn’t it strange that, of all the creatures on
the Earth, you happen to be human? The SSA would be
a strong argument against the typical mammal or bird
being a conscious observer, to say nothing of the trillions
of other animals.5
Unrestrained application of the SSA leads to a far more
radical, and ominous conclusion, however. Why not ap-
ply the SSA to other humans? We can do this even if
we restrict our reference class to humanity and remain
agnostic about multiverses, aliens, and animal conscious-
ness.6 Solipsism, the idea that one is the only conscious
being in existence and everything else is an illusion, is
an age-old speculation.7 Obviously, most people do not
favor solipsism a priori, but it cannot actually be dis-
the many-world interpretation on temporal grounds, since that
interpretation predicts that the number of observers grows expo-
nentially.
4 Hartle and Srednicki [40] argue the unrestricted SSA is absurd
because we could rule out aliens on Jupiter this way. But this
example could be counted as a success: Jupiter really is unin-
habited despite the many astronomers of past centuries who be-
lieved other planets were similar to Earth on typicality grounds
[42]. The real problem is that the unrestricted SSA rules against
intelligent life everywhere else, even the nearest 10100 Hubble
volumes. Animal consciousness is a better example as we have
reason to suspect many animals are indeed conscious in some
way [e.g., 43].
5 Neal [6] makes a similar point with non-animal consciousness, us-
ing a thought experiment where we have a theory about bacterial
self-awareness with low but not insignificant prior probability.
6 Bostrom [2] argues that an anthropic prediction is robust if it is
the same for a wide range of reference classes. By this criterion,
solipsism seems to be one of the most robust conclusions possi-
ble, holding whether the reference class is all possible observers,
observers within our universe, organic lifeforms, vertebrates, hu-
mans, humans living on the Earth, humans living at this very
moment, and by the SSSA, humans who are exactly you at dif-
ferent points in your life. It fails only if your reference class
is yourself in this instant, or something nearly as restrictive, in
which case the evidential power of typicality arguments generally
disappears.
7 If “observers” must be conscious, we could evaluate the more
conservative hypothesis that other humans exist but have no
qualia, merely behaving as if conscious [44]. We do not even
have to reject physicalism for this, merely postulate that qualia
result from some quirk of your individual brain.
proved, only ignored as untenable.
What happens when we apply the SSA to our sliver
of solipsistic doubts? Let ǫ be the credence you assign
to all solipsistic ideas that are constrained by SSA. To
be sure, we usually do not grant much credence to solip-
sism, so perhaps ∼ 10−9 is a reasonable value. But if
one is not unduly prejudiced against solipsism, ǫ can-
not be zero. If one woke up to find one’s perceptions
of the Universe melting away, leaving one as an isolated
Boltzmann brain in a tiny collapsing cosmos, for exam-
ple, surely one would want to at least be able to enter-
tain that idea (see Section VJ). The remaining credence,
1 − ǫ will be assigned to the idea that other people are
real. What are the odds that you are you, according to
the SSA? The principle assigns a likelihood of ≤ 1/1011
for a realist worldview; only the normalization factor in
Bayes’ theorem preserves its viability. But the SSA in-
dicates that, according to solipsism, the likelihood that
an observer has your data instead of the “data” of one
of the hallucinatory “observers” you are imagining is 1.
From the point of view of solipsism, the premise that
other people actually exist is a Large model. Applying
Bayes’ theorem, the credence you should now assign to
it is Psolip ≥ ǫ/[1/Npast + ǫ(1− 1/Npast)]:
Psolip &
{
1− 1/(ǫNpast) (ǫNpast ≫ 1)
ǫNpast (ǫNpast . 1)
.
If your prior willingness to entertain solipsism was above
∼ 10−11, the SSA magnifies it into a virtual certainty.8
Actually, the situation is much worse: Bostrom [2]
further proposes a Strong Self-Sampling Assumption
(SSSA), wherein individual conscious experiences are the
fundamental unit of observations. What are the odds
that you happen to make this observation at this point
of your life instead of any other? Suppose it takes 100 sec-
onds to fully make the observation that one exists in this
moment, presumably a generous estimate. Given a mean
human life expectancy over history of ten years [38], the
SSSA increases Npast by a factor of ∼ 3 million. Your
credence in extreme solipsism, where only your current
observer-moment exists, should be amplified by a factor
∼ 3×1017, and more if one believes there is good evidence
for an interstellar future, animal consciousness, alien in-
telligences, or the existence of a multiverse. Unless one
is unduly prejudiced against it – invoking the absurdly
small prior probabilities that are the problem in the SIA
– the principle behind the Doomsday Argument impels
one into believing nobody else in existence is conscious,
not even your past and future selves. The SSSA does
8 We might try to rescue realism by including every perceived per-
son in our reference class, so even in solipsism there are 1011
“humans”. Yet this is almost as bizarre as solipsism itself. We
would include fictional characters or hallucinations in the real
world and might gain enormous retrocausal powers by simply
intending to imagine populated galaxies.
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allow there to be multiple copies of you, exactly identi-
cal to yourself, since you have no way of telling which of
these selves you are, but that is hardly any consolation.
One might object that “me, now” is a superficial class,
that everyone in the real world is just as unique and un-
representative, so there is no surprise that you are you
instead of everything else. This is invalid according to
unrestricted Copernican reasoning. You are forced to
grapple with the fundamental problem that your solip-
sistic model has only one possible “outcome” but realist
models have many because there really do exist many
different people – in the same way that drawing a royal
flush from a stack of cards on the first try is very strong
evidence it is rigged even if every possible draw is equally
unlikely with a randomly shuffled deck. Nor can one ar-
gue a distinction in that all currently living people are
equally typical as distinct individuals, whereas a Large
future would have us living in an atypically “special”
time in a Large future. The x-day Arguments show that
there exists an Nx that is small for each individual in
any population. We have no reason to limit Doomsday
to birthrank instead of any measure of similarity between
people – to do so is ignoring data.
Later sections will provide a way out of solipsism even
if one accepts the SSA (Section VB). This is to fine-grain
the solipsism hypothesis by making distinctions about
what the sole observer hallucinates, or which of all hu-
mans is the “real” one. The distinctions between specific
observers are thus important and cannot be ignored. In
the context of the Doomsday Argument, we can ask what
is the likelihood that the sole solipsist observer imagines
themself to have a birthrank of 1011 instead of 1 or 1050.
Indeed, Section IV argues that fine-graining is an impor-
tant part of understanding the role of typicality. As we
will see, using fine-grained models can impose constraints
that prevent its use in Doomsday Arguments.
E. The anti-Copernican conclusion of the maximal
Copernican Principle
The Copernican Principle is inherently unstable when
adopted uncritically. Even a small perturbation to one’s
initial prior, a sliver of doubt about there really being
109 billion people born so far, is magnified to the point
where it can completely dominate one’s views about the
existence of other beings. This in turn leads to epis-
temic instability, as everything one has learned from
the external world is thrown into doubt. Although the
SSA started out as a way of formalizing the Coperni-
can Principle, it has led to what may be considered an
anti-Copernican conclusion in spirit. Weaker Copernican
principles suggest that you consider yourself one of many
possible minds, not considering yourself favored, just as
the Earth is one of many planets and not the pivot of
the Universe. But this strong formulation suggests that
you are the only kind of mind, unique in all of existence.
Instead of a panoply of intelligences, we get at most an
endless procession of copies of you and no one else. Like
the anthropic principle, the most extreme versions of the
Copernican principle presumptuously tell you that you
are fundamental.
III. DECONSTRUCTING TYPICALITY
A. Why is typicality invoked at all?
Typicality, the principle behind the SSA, has been in-
voked to explain how we can conclude anything at all in
a large Universe. Since the Universe appears to be in-
finite, all possible observations with nonzero probability
will almost surely be made by some observers somewhere
in the cosmos by the anthropic principle. That is, the
mere fact that there exists an observer who makes some
observation has likelihood 1 in every cosmology where it
is possible. Furthermore, a wide range of observations
is possible in any given world model. Quantum theories
grant small but nonzero probabilities for measurements
that diverge wildly from the expected value: that a pho-
tometer will detect no photons if it is pointed at the Sun,
for example, or that every uranium nucleus in the Earth
will spontaneously decay within the next ten seconds.
Most extreme are Boltzmann brains: any possible ob-
server (for a set of physical laws) with any possible mem-
ory can be generated wherever there is a thermal bath.
Thus we expect there exist observers who make any pos-
sible observation in infinite cosmologies that can sustain
cognition. Without an additional principle to evaluate
likelihoods, no evidence can ever favor one theory over
another and science is impossible [2, 8, 9, 32].
The common solution has been to include indexical
information in our distributions. Indexicals are state-
ments relating your first-person experience to the out-
side world. They are not meaningful for a third-person
observer standing outside the world and perceiving its
entire physical content and structure. The SSA, and the
SIA in reply, attempt to harness indexicals to learn things
about the world: they convert the first-person statement
into a probabilistic objective statement about the world,
by treating you as a “typical” observer. Frequently, the
physical distinctions between observers are left unspeci-
fied, as if they are intrinsically identical and only their
environments are different.
When we make an observation, we do at least learn
that we are an observer with data D, which is indexical
information. The idea of these arguments, then, is to
construct a single joint distribution for physical theories
about the third-person nature of the cosmos and index-
ical theories about which observer we are. Often this
is implicit – rather than having specified theories about
which observer we are, indexical information is evaluated
with an indexical likelihood, the fraction of observers in
our reference class with data D. While all possible ob-
servations are consistent with a theory in an infinite Uni-
verse, most observations will be clustered around a typi-
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cal value that indicates the true cosmology [2]. Thus the
indexical likelihoods result in us favoring models that pre-
dict most observers have data similar to ours over those
where our observations are a fluke.
Typicality is usually fine for most actual cosmological
observations, but it yields problematic conclusions when
attempting to choose between theories with different pop-
ulation sizes. These problems will motivate the develop-
ment of Fine-Graining with Attached Indexicals (FGAI)
approach to typicality over the next three sections.
B. Sleeping Beauty as three different thought
experiments
The core of the Doomsday Argument can be modeled
with a thought experiment known as the Sleeping Beauty
problem [45]. In this thought experiment, all participat-
ing observers are treated as indistinguishable. Imagine
that you are participating in experiment in which you
wake up in a room for some number of days. Each day
your memory of any previous days has been wiped, so
you have no sense of which day it is. Now, suppose you
knew that the experiment was either Short, lasting for
just Monday, or Long, lasting for Monday and Tuesday.
In the original formulation of the thought experiment
(SB-O), the experimenters flip a coin, running the Short
version if it came up Heads and the Long version if it
came up Tails [45]. You wake up in the room, not know-
ing how the coin landed, ignorant of whether you are in
a Short run or a Long run. What probability should you
assign to the possibility that the coin landed heads and
the run is Short, 1/2 or 1/3?9 An intuitive answer might
be that you have absolutely no basis to choose between
Short and Long because the coin is fair, and that you
should have an uninformative prior assigning weight 1/2
to each possibility.10 However, the SIA implies that the
probability should be 1/3, because each possible day in
each outcome is equally plausible as your current day.
More awakenings happen in the Long run, so you’d be
more likely to be among them on this day.
If you then learn that it is Monday, the SSA would
increase your credence in the Short run. For a prior
probability of 1/3, you would come to believe there is
1/2 probability you are in the Short run. Applied to
the uninformative prior, your credence would instead be
2/3. The thought experiment is directly analogous to
9 To emphasize the potential for unrealistic Bayes factors, consider
the case where you are immortal and the Long version lasts for
a trillion days. If you use the SIA, could you ever be convinced
the experimenters are truthful if they come in and tell you the
coin landed on Heads?
10 This paper uses thought experiments where there is a simple
binary choice between Small and Large models, for which 1/2 is
the uninformative prior probability. If there are many choices for
Ntotal spanning a wide range of values, a flat log prior in Ntotal
is more appropriate.
the Doomsday Argument; one either starts with a bias
against Short runs (with the SIA) or ends with a bias
against Long runs (without the SIA).
The conventional Sleeping Beauty thought experiment
has been used to examine the SSA and competing princi-
ples [6], but we have to be careful about drawing analo-
gies to our own predicament. We especially must be clear
about what probability actually represents, whether it is
solely Bayesian and subjective or frequentist and objec-
tive. The following versions of the experiment11 clarify
this distinction (see Figure 1):
(SB-A) You know that the experiments proceed
with a Short run followed by a Long run of the ex-
periment, and you are participating in both. Each
day, you wake up with an identical psychological
state. Today you wake up in the room. With what
probability is today one the day you awaken during
the Short run?
(SB-B) The experimenters have decided, through
some unknown deterministic process, to run only
either the Short or the Long version of the experi-
ment. You have absolutely no idea which one they
have decided upon. Each day, you wake up with an
identical psychological state. Today you wake up
in the room. What credence should you assign to
the belief that the experimenters have chosen to do
the Short run?
(SB-C) The experimenters have decided, through
some unknown deterministic process, to run only
either the Short or a variant of the Long version of
the experiment. In the modified Long experiment,
they run the experiment on both Monday and Tues-
day, but only wake you on one of the two, chosen
by another unknown deterministic process. Today
you wake up in the room. What credence should
you assign to the belief that the experimenters have
chosen to do the Short run? If you learn it is Mon-
day, what credence should you then calculate for
the Short run?
When we treat indexical facts on the same footing as
physical propositions, we are tempted to make analogies
between SB-A and SB-B or between SB-C and SB-B. In
each case, only one in three of the possible outcomes is in
the Short experiment, and only one of the two possible
11 Garisto [30] independently notes the distinction between an “in-
clusiverse” like SB-A where all possibilities exist and an “exclusi-
verse” like SB-B where only some exist, arguing there is a weight-
ing factor in SB-A that makes 1/3 the correct initial credence. As
per Garisto, P prior(S) = 1/2 in SB-B because of exclusive selec-
tion over high-level theories. In Weighted FGAI (Section VC),
however, there is no observer selection effect when learning “to-
day is Monday”, because there is no single likelihood to interpret
that observation but instead multiple provisional likelihoods with
shifting weights.
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Long experiment awakenings occur on a Monday. Yet
these analogies are deeply flawed. Both SB-A and SB-
C have obvious uninformative priors yielding the same
result with or without the SIA, but they point to different
resolutions of the Sleeping Beauty problem: 1/3 for SB-A
and 1/2 for SB-C.
SB-A and SB-B posit an indexical uncertainty map-
ping your current first-person experience to one of the
identical days. SB-A has this as the only uncertainty,
with all relevant objective facts of the world known with
complete certainty. Thus, the combined SIA and SSA
amount to simply counting days and grouping them; they
will give you the right answers most of the time. Because
only an indexical is at stake, there can be no Presumptu-
ous Philosopher problem in SB-A – you are already ab-
solutely certain of the “cosmology”. But although it has
been reduced to triviality in SB-A, there is actually a sec-
ond set of credences for the third-person physical facts of
this world: our 100% credence in this cosmology, with
both a Short and Long run.
In both SB-B and SB-C, you are in a state of total
uncertainty about the objective state of the world itself.
A Bayesian probability distribution about whether you
are in the Short or Long versions has no relation to any
objective fact about the matter. The objective frequen-
tist probability that you are in the Short run with SB-
B is neither 1/2 nor 1/3 – it is either 0 or 1. Instead
the Bayesian prior is solely an internal one, used by you
to weigh the relative merits of different theories of the
cosmology of the experiment. Thus, it makes no sense
to start out implicitly biased against the Short run, so
the probability 1/2 is more appropriate for a Bayesian
distribution. For all you know, the experimentalists are
anti-Long run extremists. Minor evidence for that – like
finding an anti-Long screed crumpled in the trash can
written by a junior associate experimenter – should re-
sult in the prior slightly favoring the Short run, which is
not possible if we adopt a 1/3 prior credence in the Short
theory.
Attempts to make analogies between situations like
SB-A and those like SB-B lead to ambiguous conclu-
sions. Some thought experiments attempt to motivate
the Doomsday Argument by making analogies with SB-
A-like scenarios – clearly we should believe we are in the
more “typical” Long population in that case (e.g., Leslie
1’s “emerald” thought experiment). Yet, arguably this
instead justifies the use of the SIA – in SB-A, one is
more likely to exist in the Large context of the Long ex-
periment, so we should be predisposed to favor a Large
model. But in SB-A-like thought experiments, the phys-
ical world model is completely specified and there is
no doubt about whether the Large population exists.
This same distinction breaks the analogy between these
thought experiments and the Doomsday Argument. SB-
B posits that you are not just trying to figure out where
you are in the world, but the nature of the world in the
first place.12
We can also contrast SB-B with SB-C, which is more
like a typical experiment in that the Large theory has
more outcomes but the same number of observers. In SB-
C, there are actually two Long hypotheses that split the
original 1/2 credence: one where you awaken on Mon-
day only and one where you awaken on Tuesday only.
The big difference between SB-B and SB-C is that there
are two possible physical outcomes in SB-C’s Long vari-
ant, but only one in SB-B’s – the observations made by
all observers in SB-B are determined by whether Short
or Long is chosen. Only the limited indexical informa-
tion available to SB-B’s participant makes it seem like
there are two outcomes. This indexical dependence is
not present in SB-C, just as there is no physical distinc-
tion in SB-A. In SB-C, learning “it is Monday” should
result in a changed credence, because learning the physi-
cal fact that “a participant awakened on Monday” is not
a determined outcome in the SB-C Long theory. This is
not a Presumptuous argument because it involves a sci-
entific observation that directly follows from the theory,
not a philosophical assumption about typicality. But in
SB-B, finding out it’s Monday is consistent with both a
Short and Long run, and the likelihood of either given
that simple physical fact on its own is 1, suggesting we
should not simply just favor the Short run.
SB-C does not accurately model x-day or any of the
solipsistic arguments either, where the number of ob-
servers itself is at stake. This is illustrated by considering
a thought experiment where we try to determine if fish
are conscious, supposing that they outnumber humans by
a hundred to one. Our theories clearly should be of the
form i.) all eight billion humans are conscious but zero
fish are, or ii.) all eight billion humans plus the eight
hundred billion fish are conscious, possibly with interme-
diate theories where only some fish are conscious. But the
equivalent of SB-C would require the fish-consciousness
hypothesis to be ii.) only eighty million humans plus
7.92 billion fish are conscious, an absurdity. It would be
absurd even if we didn’t know the world’s population:
there is no physical mechanism by which the existence of
conscious fish somehow prevents conscious humans from
existing.13 The same disanalogy with SB-C applies to
arguments about exotic extraterrestrial intelligences, in-
terstellar futures, and multiverses.
12 Some attempt to resolve the experiment by considering how the
participant should bet against the experimenter, using expecta-
tion values. But the frequentist expectation value is meaningless
in SB-B because the choice is deterministic. Rerunning the ex-
periment will result in the same outcome.
13 We can assume for the purpose of this argument that physical
constraints on resources and the total carrying capacity of the
world are too weak to bear on the question of sentient fish. Pre-
sumably we already know fish exist and outnumber humanity,
even if we do not know their population, and are just wondering





























































































FIG. 1. Illustration of how different methods of treating indexicals affect Bayesian credences about Short (S) and Long (L)
runs in SB-A, SB-B, and SB-C, before and after learning it is Monday (M) instead of Tuesday (T). The physical theory has
already been determined in SB-A, while the observer position in each possible physical theory is determined in SB-C. Ruled
out hypotheses are colored in black and do not count towards the normalization. The SSA, with or without the SIA, leads
to presumptuous conclusions in SB-B. In naive FGAI, the indexical and physical distributions are not mixed. Instead, there
is an overarching physical distribution, and each model has an associated indexical probability distribution (indicated by the
arrows).
C. Separating indexical and physical facts
Simple Bayesian updating does give reasonable results
in SB-A and SB-C, where only indexical or only phys-
ical propositions are being considered. This suggests
that any theory of typicality should reduce to Bayesian
updating under these circumstances. But Presumptu-
ous Philosopher-like problems arise in SB-B whether we
adopt the SSA alone or the SSA with the SIA. This sug-
gests that it is the mixing of physical and indexical facts
into one joint distribution that leads to trouble.
The reason we cannot mix indexical and physical
propositions could be because they are fundamentally
different. Indexicals are like statements about coordi-
nate systems. We are free to set the origin wherever we
want as long as we are consistent, but that freedom does
not fundamentally change the way the Universe objec-
tively works. It follows that purely indexical facts can-
not directly constrain purely physical world models. The
paradoxes are a result of trying to force indexical data
into working like physical data.14
Since Bayesian updating does work in SB-A and SB-
C, we can suppose there are in fact two types of cre-
dence distributions, physical and indexical. In FGAI
there is an overarching physical distribution describing
our credences in physical world models. Attached to
each physical hypothesis, there is also an indexical dis-
tribution (Figure 1). Each indexical distribution is up-
dated in response to indexical information [c.f., 32]. The
physical distribution is insulated from changes in the in-
14 It might even be possible to create similar paradoxes by creat-
ing joint probabilities with other types of facts, like moral or
aesthetic facts. A key difference, though, is that indexical un-
certainty leads to uncertainty in how to even evaluate physical
likelihoods.
dexical distribution. Within the context of a particular
world-model, one may apply typicality assumptions like
the SSA/SIA to the indexical assumption. The sepa-
ration between physical and indexical distributions pro-
tects world models from the extremely small likelihoods
of both the SSA and the SIA.
In the Sleeping Beauty thought experiment, when the
experimenter announces it is the first day of the exper-
iment, you learn both an physical fact (“a participant
wakes up on Monday”) and an indexical fact (“I’m the
me waking on Monday”). The physical fact is consistent
with both a Short and Long run in all variants of the
thought experiment, so the physical prior is unchanged.
In SB-B, the indexical fact leaves the Short hypothesis
indexical distribution unchanged, but it changes the in-
dexical distribution for the Long theory. FGAI confines
the effects of indexical information. In SB-B, the phys-
ical prior remains unchanged, and remains at 1/2 even
after learning it is Monday. So the prior probability of
a Short run in Sleeping Beauty can be either 1/2 or 1/3
[c.f., 46]: it is 1/2 in the physical model distribution used
in SB-B and SB-C and 1/3 in the indexical distribution
used in SB-A.
D. The frequentist limit and microhypotheses
Nonetheless, the frequentist 1/3 probability does in a
way slip back in if the experiment is modified to more
closely match frequentist assumptions. Consider:
(SB-Bn) You know for certain that the exper-
iment is being run for n times where n ≫ 1.
Whether a given run is Short or Long is de-
termined through some deterministic but pseudo-
random process, such that any possible sequence
of Shorts and Longs is equally credible from your
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FIG. 2. If the Sleeping Beauty experiment is run many times,
with each possible sequence of Long and Short a priori equally
likely, a vast number of microhypotheses about the sequence
of Short and Long is generated. Shown here are the 64 mi-
crohypotheses when there are n = 6 runs. Attached to every
single one of these fine models is an indexical distribution.
point of view. Each day, you wake up with an iden-
tical psychological state. Today you wake up in the
room. What credence should you assign to the be-
lief that today is happening during a Short run?15
Now there is a large number of competing physical hy-
potheses, 2n in total, one for each possible sequence of
Shorts and Longs. As before, each of those hypotheses
has an attached indexical distribution (Figure 2). From
a practical point of view, however, in most of these hy-
potheses about half of the runs are Short and half are
Long. Although the physical hypotheses may differ in
detail, the statistical properties of the great majority are
similar. Hence, one becomes nearly certain of a roughly
even proportion between Short and Long runs simply
through combinatorics. Furthermore, this statistical sim-
ilarity translates to the indexical distributions: in most
indexical distributions, ∼ 1/3 of the awakenings happen
in the Short run. As n tends to infinity, the rare out-
liers with unbalanced Short/Long runs become insignifi-
cant, and the physical distribution becomes trivial when
viewed from a coarse-grained perspective; only the index-
ical distributions remain unconstrained. The probability
you would most care about is then 1/3. 16
SB-Bn, where most of the individual sequences are
statistically similar, calls to mind statistical mechanics,
15 Bostrom [46] proposes a similar thought experiment, the “Three
Thousand Weeks”, concluding that 1/3 is the correct probability
to use.
16 Interestingly, this suggests that if the Universe is infinite and the
decision between Short and Long is indeterministic (e.g., chosen
by radioactive decay), then you should assume the probability
you are in a Short run is 1/3. This is because an infinite uni-
verse actually implements the frequentist limit [see also 30]. You
essentially know the statistical properties of the physical “cos-
mology” with 100% certainty. On the other hand, if the exper-
imenters are using a deterministic strategy, or the universe is
small enough, there is only one trial with two outcomes, just as
in SB-B, implying your credence in Short should be 1/2. This
does lead to the odd situation where our credences depend on
whether or not a multiverse exists [30].
where a vast number of physical microstates are grouped
into a small number of distinguishable macrostates. By
analogy, I call each possible detailed world model a mi-
crohypothesis, which are then grouped into macrotheories
defined by statistical properties.
IV. REPLACING TYPICALITY
A. The fine-grained approach to typicality
How are we to make inferences in a large universe,
then, without directly mixing indexicals into the credence
distribution? I propose that most of the work performed
by typicality can instead be performed by fine-graining.
Fine-graining of physical theories is the first principle of
FGAI.
The common practice is to treat observers in a fairly
large reference class as interchangeable when discussing
their observations, but this is merely a convenience. In
fact, we can make fine distinctions between observers –
between Earth and an inhabited planet in Hubble vol-
ume # 239,921, for example, or between me and you, or
even between you in 2021 and you in 2020. Macrotheories
often cannot predict exactly which specific observer mea-
sures a particular datum. Thus, every theory is resolved
into myriads ofmicrohypotheses, each of which does make
these predictions. Because the distinctions between these
observers are physical, statements about a specific ob-
server making a particular measurement are evaluated
as purely physical propositions, without invoking index-
icals. Some microhypotheses will be consistent with the
data, others will not be. The resulting credences in the
macrotheories are entirely determined by summing the
posterior weight over all microhypotheses, in many cases
through simple counting arguments. Typicality then fol-
lows from the likelihood values of the microhypotheses
– as it indeed does in conventional probability, where
specific “special” events like getting a royal flush from
a randomly shuffled deck are no more rare than specific
mundane outcomes [47]. Thus, in most cases, there is
no need to invoke any separate Copernican principle, be-
cause it is a demonstrable consequence of our theories.
The other main precept of FGAI is that purely index-
ical facts do not directly constrain third-person proposi-
tions about the physical world, rather modifying index-
ical distributions attached to each world model. Obser-
vations must be treated as physical third-person events
when constraining the physical distribution. Statements
like “I picked ball 3 out of the urn” or “I am the 109
billionth human” must be recast into third-person state-
ments like “Brian Lacki picked ball 3 out of the urn”
or “Mary the Probability Scientist is the 109 billionth
human”. Each microhypothesis requires an observation
model, a list of possible observations that each observer
may make. Observation models necessarily impose phys-
ical constraints on which observations can be made by
whom, forbidding impossible observations like “Hypatia
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of Alexandria observed that her peer was Cyborg 550-
319447 of Gliese 710” from being considered as possible
outcomes.
The fine-graining is most straightforward when ev-
ery microhypothesis predicts that all physically indistin-
guishable experiments lead to the same outcome. This
follows when we expect conditionalization to entirely re-
strict possible observations. For example, the Milky Way
could be the product of an indeterministic quantum fluc-
tuation, but copies of our Earth with its data (e.g., pho-
tographs of the Milky Way from inside) do not appear in
elliptical galaxies except through inconceivably contrived
series of coincidences. More difficult are purely indeter-
ministic cases, when any specific observer can observe any
outcome, which is true for most quantum experiments. I
will argue that even then we can form microhypotheses
by assuming the existence of an appropriate coordinate
system (Section IVE).
A more serious difficulty is what to do when differ-
ent plausible indexical hypotheses would lead to differ-
ent likelihood evaluations for microhypotheses. That is,
we may not know enough about where we are to deter-
mine whether a microhypothesis predicts an observation
or not. In this section, I will adopt the perspective that I
call Naive FGAI: we adopt the maximum possible likeli-
hood over all observers we could be, as in the treatment
of SB-B in section III C, because we have no basis for
accepting any further conclusion.
B. Naive FGAI
FGAI constructs the physical probability distributions
using the Hierarchical Bayes framework, dividing theories
into finer hypotheses about internal parameters, possibly
with intermediate levels. Suppose we have M macrothe-
ories τ1, τ2, ... τM . Each macrotheory τk has mk micro-
hypotheses µk,1, µk,2, ..., µk,mk . Each microhypothesis
inherits some portion of its parent macrotheory’s cre-
dence or weight. Sometimes, when the microhypothe-
ses correspond to exact configurations resulting from a
known probabilistic (e.g., flips of an unfair coin), then the
prior credence in each P priork,j can be calculated by scaling
the macrotheory’s total prior probability accordingly. In
other cases, we have no reason to favor one microhypoth-
esis over another, and by the Principle of Indifference, we
assign each microhypothesis in a macrotheory equal prior
probability: P priork,j = P
prior
k /mk. Some macrotheories
are instead naturally split into mesohypotheses describ-
ing intermediate-level parameters, which in turn are fine-
grained further into microhypotheses. Mesohypotheses
are natural when different values of these intermediate-
level parameters result in differing numbers of outcomes
– like if a first coin flip determines the number of fur-
ther coin flips whose results are reported. Finally, in
each µk,j , we might be found at any of a number of loca-
tions. More properly, as observers we follow trajectories
through time, following a sequence of observations at par-
ticular locations, as we change in response to new data
[c.f., 46]. The set Ok,j(D) is the set of possible observer-
trajectories we could be following allowed by the micro-
hypothesis µk,j and the data D. The set Ok,j describes
our reference class if µk,j is true.
In Naive FGAI, prior credences P priork,j in µk,j are up-
dated by data D according to:
P posk,j =
P priork,j × max
i∈Ok,j(D)












where L(µk,j |o@i → D) is the likelihood of µk,j if the
observer (o) located at position i in Ok,j(D) observes
data D. Of course if the likelihoods are equal for all
observers in the reference class Ok,j(D), equation 3 re-
duces to Bayes’ formula. The posterior credences in the
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Naive FGAI is sufficient to account for many cases where
typicality is invoked. Paradoxes arise when the number of
observers itself is in question, as in Doomsday, requiring
a more sophisticated treatment (Section V).
C. A simple urn experiment
In some cases, microhypotheses and observations mod-
els are nearly trivial. Consider the following urn problem:
you are drawing a ball from an urn placed before you
that contains a well-mixed collection of balls, numbered
sequentially starting from 1. You know the urn contains
either one ball (theory A) or ten (theory B), and start
with equal credence in each theory. How does drawing a
ball and observing its number constrain these theories?
Both theory A and theory B have microhypotheses of the
form “The urn contains N balls and ball j is drawn at
the time of experiment”. In theory A, there is only one
microhypothesis, which inherits the full 50% of Theory
A’s prior weight. Theory B has 10 microhypotheses, one
for each possible draw and each of equal credence, so its
microhypotheses start with 5% credence each. Each mi-
crohypotheses about drawing ball j has an observation
model containing the proposition that you observe ex-
actly ball j – this observation is a physical event, since
you are a physical being.
Then the likelihoods of an observed draw is either 1 (if
the ball drawn is that predicted in the microhypothesis)
or 0 (if the ball is not the predicted one). If we draw
ball 3, for example, the credence in all hypotheses except
Theory B’s “Ball 3 is drawn” microhypothesis is zero.
Then the remaining microhypothesis has 100% credence,
and Theory B has 100% credence as well. If instead ball
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1 is drawn, Theory A’s sole microhypothesis and one of
Theory B’s microhypotheses survive unscathed, while the
other nine microhypotheses of Theory B are completely
suppressed. That is, 100% of Theory A’s credence sur-
vives, while only 10% of Theory B’s credence remains;
therefore, post-observation, the credence in Theory A is
10/11 and the credence in Theory B is 1/11. This, of
course, matches the usual expectation for the thought
experiment.
But what if instead you and 99 other attendees at a
cosmology conference were drawing from the urn with
replacement and you were prevented from telling each
other your results? If we regard all one hundred par-
ticipants as exactly identical observers, the only distinct
microhypotheses seem to be the frequency distribution of
each ball j being drawn. Then naive FGAI without mod-
ification would prevent any significant update to Theory
B’s credence if you draw ball 1 because all you know is
that you are a participant-observer and there exists an
observer-participant who draws ball 1, which is nearly
certain to be true (but see Section IVE). In this case,
inference would seem to require something like the SSA,
where the likelihood of a “typical” participant drawing
ball 1 is 10%. Yet this is not necessary in practice be-
cause if this experiment were carried out at an actual
cosmology conference, the participants would be distin-
guishable. We then can fine-grain Theory B further by
listing each attendee by name and specifying which ball
they draw for each microhypothesis, and forming an ob-
servation model where names are matched to drawn balls.
For example, we could order the attendees by alphabeti-
cal order and each microhypothesis would be a 100-vector
of integers from 1 to 10.17
With fine-graining, there is only 1100 = 1 microhypoth-
esis in Theory A – all participants draw ball 1 – but 10100
microhypotheses in Theory B. Furthermore, in only 1099
of those microhypotheses do you specifically draw ball 1
and observe ball 1. Thus only 10% of Theory B’s micro-
hypotheses survive your observation that you drew ball
1. The credence in Theory B is again 1/11, but is de-
rived without appealing to typicality. Instead, typicality
follows from the combinatorics. In fact, the original one-
participant version of this thought experiment can be
regarded as a coarse-graining of this 100-participant ver-
sion, after marginalizing over the unknown observations
of the other participants.
Appendix A presents a simple worked example with
explicit microhypotheses.
17 Even if all the observers start as identical, they can be distin-
guished by assigning identifiers, perhaps based on their distinct
locations at some instant.
D. Implicit microhypotheses: A thought
experiment about life on Proxima b
In other cases, the microhypotheses can be treated as
abstract, implicit entities in a theory. A theory may pre-
dict an outcome has some probability, but provide no
further insight into which situations actually lead to the
outcome. This happens frequently when we are actually
trying to constrain the value of a parameter in some over-
arching theory that describes the workings of unknown
physics. Historical examples include basic cosmological
parameters like the Hubble constant. Not only do we
not know their values, we have no adequate theories to
explicitly predict them. Yet these parameters are sub-
ject to cosmic variance; some observers in a big enough
Universe should deduce unusual values far from their ex-
pectation values. Naive FGAI can be adapted for such
theories by positing there are implicit microhypotheses
that we cannot specify yet. The probability that we ob-
serve an outcome is then treated as if it is indicating the
fraction of microhypotheses where that outcome occurs.
Suppose we have two models about the origin of life, L-
A and L-B, both equally plausible. L-A predicts that all
habitable planets around red dwarfs have life. L-B pre-
dicts that the probability that a habitable zone planet
around a red dwarf has life is 10−100. Despite this, we
will suppose that the conditions required for life on the
nearest potentially habitable exoplanet Proxima b are
not independent of our existence on Earth, and that any
copy of us in a large Universe will observe the same re-
sult. The butterfly effect could impose this condition-
alization – small perturbations induced by or correlated
with (un)favorable conditions on Proxima b may have
triggered some improbable event on Earth necessary for
our evolution. We wish to constrain L-A and L-B by ob-
serving the nearest habitable exoplanet, Proxima b, and
we discover that Proxima b does have life on it.
If we apply Copernican reasoning, we might say that in
L-B, only one in 10−100 inhabited G dwarf planets would
observe life around the nearest red dwarf, and that as
typical observers, we should assign a likelihood of 10−100
to L-B. Thus, L-B is essentially ruled out.
L-B does not directly specify which properties of a red
dwarf are necessary for life on its planets; it merely im-
plies that the life is the result of some unknown but im-
probable confluence of properties. Nonetheless, we can
interpret L-B as grouping red dwarfs into 10100 equiva-
lence classes, based on stellar and planetary characteris-
tics. Proxima Centauri would be a member of only one
of these. L-B then would assert that only one equiva-
lence class of 10100 bears life. Thus, L-B actually implic-
itly represents 10100 microhypotheses, each one a virtual
statement about which equivalence class is the one that
hosts life (Figure 3). In contrast, L-A has only one mi-
crohypothesis since the equivalence class contains all red
dwarfs. We then proceed with the calculation as if these
microhypotheses were known.
If we observe life on Proxima b, then the sole microhy-
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FIG. 3. Extremely simplified representation of how FGAI treats theories like L-B. Probabilities of observing a particular
outcome in a macrotheory may be presumed to result from some unknown fine-scale division of parameter space into regions
delineating different equivalence classes. Then microhypotheses would be constructed by considering all possible outcomes for
all regions. For L-B, we observe the red dwarf nearest to Earth (Proxima ⊕) and see whether it is inhabited (flower symbol).
The observation of an inhabited Proxima ⊕ reduces the number of allowed microhypotheses. a.: observers on other planets
distinguishable from Earth would observe red dwarfs with different properties (Proxima X, Y, and Z) and probe different classes.
b.: many identical Earths observe distinct Proxima ⊕ (red stars). These are treated by assuming there is some indexing that
allows microhypotheses to be constructed, and their likelihoods calculated by symmetry.
pothesis of L-A survives unscathed, but implicitly only
one microhypothesis of L-B of the 10100 would survive.
Thus, after the observation, L-A has a posterior credence
of 100%/(1+10−100), while L-B has a posterior credence
of 10−100/(1+10−100). As we would hope, FGAI predicts
that we would be virtually certain that L-A is correct,
which is the result we would expect if we assumed we
observed a “typical” red dwarf.
What of the other inhabited G dwarf planets in an
infinite Universe? The nearest red dwarfs to these will
have different characteristics and most of them will be-
long to different equivalence classes (Figure 3). In prin-
ciple, we could construct microhypotheses that specify
what each type of these observers will around their near-
est red dwarf, and implicitly we assume they exist. If
we failed to develop the capability to determine whether
Proxima b has life but aliens from 18 Scorpii broadcast to
us that their nearest red dwarf has life, the result would
be the same. Because we do not know what the equiv-
alence classes are, we cannot be sure about which types
of observers share equivalence classes. We might instead
define equivalence class #1 to have life, and then consider
each microhypothesis to be a mapping between distinct
types of observer and equivalence class number.
E. Fine-graining and implicit coordinate systems
The strictest interpretation of the separation of physi-
cal and indexical facts is that we cannot constrain phys-
ical models if the observed outcome happens to any
observer physically indistinguishable from us. This is
untenable, at least in a large enough universe – quan-
tum mechanics predicts that all non-zero probability out-
comes will happen to our “copies” in a large universe.
But this would mean no measurement of a quantum me-
chanical parameter can be constraining. Surely if we do
not observe any radiodecays in a gram of material over a
century, we should be able to conclude that its half-life
is more than a nanosecond, even though a falsely stable
sample will be observed by some copy of us out there in
the infinite universe.18
Strict indeterminism is not necessary for this to be a
problem, either. In the last section, we might have sup-
posed that the existence of life on Proxima b depends on
its exact physical microstate five billion years ago, and
that these microstates are scattered in phase space. Yet,
Proxima b is more massive than the Earth and has a
vaster number of microstates – by the pigeonhole princi-
ple, in an infinite Universe, most Earths exactly identical
to ours would neighbor a Proxima b that had a different
microstate and could observe a different outcome about
whether it has life (Figure 3).
But the separation of indexicals and physical theories
need not be so strict. Indexicals are regarded in FGAI
as propositions about coordinate systems. In physical
18 Leslie [1] takes the position that indeterminism blunts SSA-like
arguments, but only if the result has not been decided yet, be-
cause it is obvious the probability of an indeterministic future
event like a dice throw cannot be affected by who we are. I be-
lieve this attempt to soften Doomdsay fails, because we are con-
sidering the probability conditionalized on you being you. The
anthropic principle is based entirely on such conditionalizing.
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theories we can and do use coordinate systems, some-
times arbitrary ones, as long as we do not ascribe undue
objective significance. We can treat these situations by
imposing an implicit indexing, as long as we do not as-
cribe undue physical significance to it. Thus, in an in-
finite Universe, we label “our” Earth as Earth 1. The
next closest Earth is Earth 2, the third closest Earth is
Earth 3, and so on. We might in fact only implicitly use
a coordinate system, designating our Earth as Earth 1
without knowing details of all the rest. Our observations
then are translated into third-person propositions about
observations of Earth 1. The definition of the coordi-
nate system imposes an indexical distribution where we
must be on Earth 1. Of course, this particular labeling
is arbitrary, but that hardly matters because we would
reach the same conclusions if we permuted the labels. If
we came into contact with some other Earth that told
us that “our” Earth was Earth 3,296 in their coordinate
system, that would not change our credence in a theory.
In a Large world, then, the microhypotheses consists of
an array listing the outcome observed by each of these im-
plicitly indexed observers. Only those microhypotheses
where Earth (or observer) 1 has a matching observation
survive. If the observed outcome contradicts the outcome
assigned to Earth 1 by the microhypothesis, we cannot
then decide we might actually be on Earth 492,155 in
that microhypothesis because Earth 492,155 does observe
that outcome. The coordinate system’s definition has al-
ready imposed the indexical distribution on us. Using an
implicit coordinate system lets us apply a fine-graining
treatment, where typicality is a consequence of combina-
torics.
There are limits to the uses of implicit coordinate sys-
tems, however, if we wish to avoid the usual Doomsday
argument and its descent into solipsism. In SB-B, could
we not assign an implicit coordinate system with today at
index 1, and the possible other day of the experiment at
index 2? A simplistic interpretation would then carve the
Long run theory into two microhypotheses: observer 1 is
on Monday and observer 2 is on Tuesday, and observer 1
is on Tuesday and observer 2 is on Monday. Upon learn-
ing it is Monday, this fine-graining would lead us to favor
the Short run theory.
There is a very important difference between SB-B and
these examples. First, the number of observers is the
same when deciding between L-A and L-B or in other typ-
ical experiments. Furthermore, in this section’s thought
experiments, our physical theory did not in any degree
predict which observers get a particular outcome. Thus
the likelihood distribution over the outcomes is exactly
identical for all observers. This is why we are able to
assign likelihoods even though the mapping between our
implicit coordinate system and some external coordinate
system is unknown. In SB-B, though, our physical theory
does predict which observer gets a particular outcome.
The likelihood of observing “it is Monday” is not iden-
tical for each day. Instead, “it is Monday” needs to be
interpreted as an indexical fact. We can indeed create an
implicit coordinate system with today at index 1 and the
other day at index 2. But we cannot calculate likelihoods
in this coordinate system – the referents of the indices in
the theory are unknown, and until we can connect the
implicit coordinates with the coordinate system used by
the Long theory, we cannot update credences either. All
we can say is that if observer 1 is located on Monday,
they observe “it is Monday” with certainty; if observer 1
is located on Tuesday, they observe “it is Tuesday” with
certainty. In these kinds of situations, a more sophisti-
cated theory is needed.
F. Naive FGAI and x-day arguments
1. Classes of x-day models in FGAI
One advantage of underpinning typicality arguments
with fine-grained hypotheses is that doing so forces one
to use a well-specified model that makes the assumptions
explicit. In an x-day Argument, each microhypothesis
corresponds to a possible permutation of people born as
well as a complete set of possible observations by each
observer (whether a human or an effectively independent
external observer like an alien). This entails an obser-
vation model, a set of constraints on who can observe
whom. In particular, realistic theories of observation are
causal – an observer cannot “observe” people living in
the future – and local – an observer cannot “observe”
another person without some physical mechanism link-
ing them.
In this section, I will discuss four general classes of
fine-grained x-day schemas, resulting in microhypothe-
ses with different combinatorial properties. These fine-
grainings are illustrated by a simplified model where we
consider only two theories [c.f., 1]: a Short/Small theory
with final human population NS and a Long/Large the-
ory with final human population NL, where NL > NS .
Each human at x-rank r is drawn from a set of possible
humans H , and measures their x-rank to be r, specify-
ing the observation model. The possible humans in H
correspond to different genetic makeups, microbiomes,
life histories, memories encoded in the brain, and so on.
The details of how humans at rank r are selected from
H form the basis for each of the different model classes
(Figure 4).
The four schemas differ by their restrictions on the
possible permutations:
Indistinguishable Observers (IO) – Every pos-
sible human is treated as identical, with H = {A}.
There is only one possible microhypothesis for each
theory because the permutations are indistinguish-
able. Any information about x-rank is treated as
purely indexical. IO is essentially the same kind of
scenario as SB-B.
Unconstrained Observers (UO) – Humans are
drawn from a very large set H (with |H | = N ) of
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FIG. 4. Different fine-grainings of the x-day Argument in FGAI have different assumptions about the interchangeability of
humans. The four basic schema shown here correspond to IO, a Sleeping Beauty-like case where all observers are treated as
indistinguishable; UO, where there are many possible humans, each of whom may be assigned to arbitrary ranks; USO, where
possible humans are grouped into subsets and each rank may drawn from only one subset, although the order of the subsets is
unknown; and KSO, where each rank draws from a fixed subset of possible humans, although which observer from each subset
is selected is arbitrary. The clouds represent an unknown or random selection from a set. The shown configurations are chosen
so that observer A (blue circle) exists with rank 1, but this is a contingent selection in the models.
distinguishable observers, and any h ∈ H can be
born at any rank r. In UO, people with different
names, identities, and memories could be treated
as distinct members of H , but these details would
no correlation with historical era.
Unconstrained Subset Ordering (USO) – The
set of possible humans H is partitioned into R (≥
NL) mutually disjoint subsetsHr, with one for each
r. Humans with rank r can only be drawn from Hr.
This reflects the fact that individuals are the result
of a vast constellation of historical circumstances
that should never be repeated again. In USO, we
can specify the contents of these subsets, but we do
not know which subset is assigned to each r. In an
infinite Universe, every “copy” of you will have the
same r as you.
Known Subset Ordering (KSO) – As in USO,
the set of possible humans is partitioned into dis-
joint subsetsHr, with humans at rank r drawn only
fromHr. Unlike USO, we already know beforehand
the ordering of these subsets – which one is H1,
H2, and so on. All that remains to be discovered is
the final human population N and which humans,
in fact, are selected out of each Hr. KSO models
emphasize how we already know, by virtue of our
historical knowledge, our place in history before ap-
plying an x-day Argument.19
19 The Doomsday Argument yields a “correct” result for most peo-
ple in history, leading Leslie [1] (and with more cavaets, Bostrom
2) to conclude that we should use it as well, as should have
early humans. This logic fails in the KSO model. Of course, the
Doomsday Argument works for most people by construction, but
in KSO, it always fails for early humans in their Large future the-
None of these models exactly corresponds to how we
would approach the Doomsday Argument, since we do
not actually know the set H or exactly how it is parti-
tioned – these details are implicit for us. But by making
explicit models, they illustrate the problems it can run
into. Of these, KSO arguably is most analogous to our
situation when we apply the Doomsday Argument, since
humans who know they live in the year 2021 cannot be
born in the Paleolithic or an interstellar future (to the
extent our memories are reliable).20 Our Short and Long
theories actually posit that everyone who has lived ex-
ist at their birthranks, and then propose an additional
Nfuture future people after us, with the likelihood of us
existing at birthrank 1011 being 1 by assumption. This
is not just a tautology because who you are is shaped by
your place in history; realistic Small and Large models
both predict that you, with all your personality, memo-
ries, and beliefs, could only appear this point in history
[as in 26].
Although previous discussion in this paper has made
it seem like there are “purely indexical” measurements,
in a strict sense this cannot be true. All measurements
are physical events. When someone learns their posi-
tion, they are actually interacting with a physical en-
ories. We are not interested in whether Doomsday “works” for
most people in history, but whether it applies to us specifically.
20 The Simulation Argument proposes that long-lived societies cre-
ate vast numbers of emulations of their ancestors, suggesting
we are likely emulations too [48]. Although the literature treats
computer simulations specifically, I believe it applies to any tech-
nology that can falsely convince someone they are living in our
epoch (e.g., virtual reality, brains in vats, lucid dreaming, etc.).
The fundamental point is our growing ability to manipulate per-
ception. I adopt the realist viewpoint that our birthrank mea-
surements are reliable except when specifically considering solip-
sistic hypotheses.
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vironment that is location-dependent and changing as
a result. Therefore, a truly physical theory cannot re-
gard observers as identical if they have different indexical
knowledge. Instead, such observers can only be found in
specific locations. For example, hypotheses about indi-
vidual A of Figure 4 really should be fine-grained into
hypotheses about A1, who can only exist at rank 1, and
A2, who can only exist at rank 2, and so on. In this sense,
USO and KSO are more physically grounded in how they
interpret indexical observations than UO or IO.
2. Self-applied x-day Arguments in Naive FGAI
An x-day Argument to constrain final population may
be self-applied by a member of the population being con-
strained (as in the Bayesian Doomsday Argument), or
applied by an external observer who happens upon the
population at some time (analogous to some of Gott 11’s
examples). Self-applied x-day Arguments are by far more
problematic. Naive FGAI provides a partial – though
incomplete – accounting of how self-applied x-day Argu-
ments like Bayesian Doomsday fare.
I will start under a “single-world” assumption that
there is only one copy of humanity in the cosmos (or
that every copy of humanity yields the same exact per-
mutations of extant humans). Then it is relatively simple
to calculate the number of microhypotheses in IO, UO,
USO, and KSO with combinatorial arguments, given the
number of humans in H (and each Hr). In Naive FGAI,
the likelihoods for each macrotheory about N is then
given by the fraction of microhypotheses consistent with
observations. Table I presents the results of such calcu-
lations, where the observer in question is labeled A and
is located at Nx = 1 without loss of generality.
In the single world model, the four schemas all arrive
at the ultimate conclusion that the surviving microhy-
pothesis fraction if A measures their rank to be 1 is inde-
pendent of N . In Naive FGAI, this means the x-day Ar-
gument is nullified in all of them. Yet they take different
routes to get there. In IO, A is the only possible indi-
vidual, and there only ever is one microhypothesis per
theory, which can never be ruled out – A merely learns
indexical information. In UO and USO, there is an SIA-
like effect when A observes themself to exist: there are
more locations for A to be born in the Large theory, so
more microhypotheses are consistent with that observa-
tion. Unlike the SIA, this indication effect is not in the
prior itself but as a result of the self-observation.21 Then
A measuring their rank of 1 culls proportionately more
microhypotheses in the Large theory, canceling this ef-
21 A having more locations to be born is a physical statement about
the number of actual physically occurring trials, with each out-
come being a physically distinct history. It does not require
“souls waiting to be born” [c.f., 1, 2].
fect.22 Finally, in KSO, where A ∈ H1 a priori, A’s
self-observation automatically implies that A is at rank
1 no matter the theory.
We can also consider “many worlds” models in which
there are many copies of humanity out the larger cos-
mos, each with different rank permutations of human
individuals. Now there would be a distribution of life-
times for all the humanities, but for simplicity we can
consider models where historical forces (e.g., nuclear war
or environmental constraints) always either end human-
ity in the near-future or fail to prevent its explosion into a
Large interstellar future. In IO, birthrank measurement
continues to be a purely indexical measurement. In the
other models, the probability any given individual A ex-
ists somewhere in a vast cosmos converges to 1. In order
to make any inferences in Naive FGAI, we would need to
use the implicit coordinates described previously, with
each A labeling their world as world I and considering
microhypotheses about who is at rank 1 in world I. In
KSO and USO this allows a kind of coarse-graining of
the microhypotheses yielding similar results to the “sin-
gle world” model.
UO yields the most ambiguous results in “many
worlds”. There will exist worlds where A measures them-
selves to have any possible rank. What A infers depends
on what kind of indexing scheme they use. If they index
only over worlds, then A is more likely to exist in world
I’s history in a Large N model, balanced by being less
likely to exist at rank 1. But previous discussion of these
implicit coordinate systems suggest A should index over
their copies: not worlds in general, but only worlds con-
taining observers identical to themself. Then, because A
is guaranteed to exist in a vast enough cosmos, there is a
Doomsday Argument. Any given A is more likely to ob-
serve themself at rank 1 if there are fewer possible ranks
they could be born at, as in the Short histories. Note,
however, in practice this requires anachronistic birth or-
ders with any individual being born with equal frequency
in every epoch in history. There would have to actually
be as many worlds where you specifically, with all your
memories, would be the first human as ones where you
live in 2021 – a physically improbable outcome and thus
incompatible with the spirit of FGAI. This anachronism
is prevented in USO and KSO, which have no Doomsday
effect even in a vast cosmos.
22 Actually, USO can be much more complicated if the different Hr
have different sizes. Then the fraction of surviving microhypothe-
ses (and posterior probabilities) is N-dependent if each possible
permutation of humans is given equal initial credence within each
macrotheory (e.g., if N = 1, Ha = {Aa}, and Hb = {Ab, Bb},
then the microhypotheses of Aa only, Ab only, and Bb only are
given equal credence). A more natural weighting is to first divide
each macrotheory into “mesohypotheses” about the ordering of
the Hr , and each permutation microhypothesis inherits an equal
fraction of its mesohypothesis’s credence (e.g., Aa only would get
twice as much initial credence as Ab only). See Appendix B for
a worked example.
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TABLE I. Microhypotheses counts for self-applied x-day Arguments in single world models
IO UO USO KSO
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(N − 1)!
(N −N)!















Fraction with A at rank 1 1 1/N 1/N 1/(RNr) 1/Nr
3. Externally-applied x-day arguments in Naive FGAI
Externally-applied x-day Arguments are structurally
similar to “urn” thought experiments, while seeming to
also justify the self-applied Doomsday Argument by anal-
ogy. Under some circumstances, one can infer some-
thing about the lifespan distribution of an external phe-
nomenon by drawing a sample of it at random (as in
the most popularized examples of Gott 11). But the key
difference with self-applied Doomsday arguments is the
existence of an additional “observer” that is the one car-
rying out the experiment, who is completely outside the
population being constrained. This adds another physi-
cal degree of freedom, which changes the microhypothesis
counts in Naive FGAI to allow for a Doomsday Argu-
ment.
Suppose an observer X happens upon humanity, with
individuals drawn from H according to IO, UO, USO, or
KSO. All of the possible sequences of human individuals
listed by the microhypotheses still are valid, and would
have the same relative prior probabilities. Yet there is a
final observable quantity, which is actually what X mea-
sures: the relative time t between humanity’s start andX
happening upon us. Even if the evolution of X is deter-
ministic enough to demand they arrive at a specific time,
X does not have enough information beforehand to select
a particular t; presumably such factors are microscopic
and chaotic. Therefore, every single one of the micro-
hypotheses of the previous section must now be divided
into T even finer microhypotheses, one for each possible
t interval X can arrive in.
Whether a Doomsday Argument applies depends on
the selection process, in particular how X found human-
ity. If X could plausibly have arrived before or after
humanity’s existence, then T is both much larger than
humanity’s lifespan TH (or its equivalent) and also in-
dependent of TH . This selection method is quite com-
mon: if one looks for examples of a rare phenomenon
at a particular location, then most likely one will be
searching in the vast epochs before or after it passes.
It is in fact less of a coincidence for X to arrive at the
right time to observe humanity if N is large, favoring a
Large history – the fraction of surviving microhypothe-
ses scales as ∼ TH/T .23 Now suppose X measures the
age of humanity. The fraction of microhypotheses consis-
tent with X arriving at this particular epoch of human
history (∼ 1/T ) is the same in Small and Large models.
Thus there is no Doomsday Argument as such; X cannot
constrain humanity’s lifespan.24
But what if there is no possibility of X failing to make
an observation of humanity? One could suppose that
rather than searching a particular location, X seeks out
the nearest technological society, scouring the infinite
cosmos if they have to until they find one. (We will also
assume all such societies have exactly the same lifespan
for the sake of argument.) This would be more like pick-
ing someone on the street to ask them their age. The
only possible values of t are values within humanity’s
lifespan – each Large history theory has a larger num-
ber of possible outcomes. The microhypothesis counts
in Table I are multiplied by N to account for the extra
degree of freedom in t. Only ∼ 1/TH of them are con-
sistent with any particular measurement of humanity’s
current age. In FGAI, X now favors Small histories, and
the externally-applied Bayesian Doomsday argument is
in effect.25
These are not the only possible models for the time of
X ’s arrival. Actual observations may deliberately be car-
23 This is well known in SETI, where the abundance of currently
observable extraterrestrial intelligences scales directly with their
mean lifespan in the Drake equation.
24 For this reason, if we specifically observe Proxima b and discover
a very young technological society, we are not justified in con-
cluding they typically live for a short period before intelligence
goes extinct on a planet forever, because of the sheer improbabil-
ity of making that discovery in any theory. We could legitimately
suspect that every planet gives rise to a long procession of many
such short-lived societies, however.
25 And what if X then announces their finding to Earth – should
we agree that humanity’s lifespan is short? Actually, we do not
have enough information to tell. It would be strong evidence if
X is the only entity carrying out a survey like this, or if there
is one or more target society per survey. If there are many such
surveys/observers, however, then we expect an observer like X to
show up frequently, even in the early epochs of a Large history.
In fact, X being the first such observer implies our history is
Long – otherwise, the multitudes of observers like X destined
to choose our Earth would have had to squeeze into our short
historical epoch before we went extinct.
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ried out at a specific time during its history, limiting the
microhypotheses about t to a narrow range independent
of TH [as in the wedding example of 49]. Furthermore,
the age of the Universe sets an upper limit on the rel-
ative |t|. We cannot rule out astrophysical objects hav-
ing lifespans of trillions of years – as we suspect most
do [50]. Finally, the observational outcomes will be bi-
ased if the population varies with time. If we survey
an exponentially growing population of human artifacts,
for example, Gott [11]’s Doomsday Argument necessarily
underpredicts the lifespan.
V. RECONSTRUCTING TYPICALITY
A. The indication paradox in Naive FGAI
Naive FGAI, supplemented by the use of implicit mi-
crohypotheses and implicit coordinate systems, is suffi-
cient to handle many practical cases where typicality is
invoked. It also suggests at least one route for address-
ing the Doomsday Argument, KSO. As noted, though,
it sometimes favors Large theories where a specific indi-
vidual is more likely to exist. Now, sometimes this can
be a reasonable assumption. Suppose SB-B was being
carried out not with one participant, but two already
extant observers, Alice and Bob, who remember their
pre-experiment lives. Further suppose one was chosen at
random to be wakened on each day, and both wake up at
the end. If Alice wakes in the experiment, she plausibly
can conclude the Long version of the experiment is more
likely because she then would be more likely to be awak-
ened. But would it really make sense if a new participant
is instead created each day with no memories and never
waking up again?26
Allowing for this SIA-like effect can lead to bizarre
consequences. Consider this compounded version of SB-
B:
(SB-B′) You wake up in the room. The experi-
menters tell you they are running SB-B, but each
day they will also flip a fair coin each day the ex-
periment is run and tell you the result. But a team
member gains your trust and tells you they are ly-
ing! The other experimenters have either adopted
Strategy A or Strategy B. In Strategy A, they tell
you the coin lands Heads on Monday, and if you
awaken on Tuesday, they will tell you it landed
Tails. In Strategy B, the supposed outcomes are op-
posite Strategy A’s. Suspecting your new friend’s
duplicity, the other experiments exclude them from
the decision of which Strategy to go with. Now the
experimenters inform you the coin landed Heads.
26 Garisto [30] emphasizes this distinction between situations where
one outcome is “Picked” and those where each outcome is simply
a different location one can “Be”.
How does that affect your credence in a Short or
Long run?
It is obvious the coin flip “result” should not affect
our beliefs in a Short or Long experiment, because of
the symmetry between the coin flip outcomes. Yet in
Naive FGAI, either coin flip “result” leads us to favoring
a Long experiment (Figure 5)! The reason is that in the
Long experiment, you will experience each outcome at
least once in either Strategy’s microhypothesis, but only
one of the two Strategies in the Short theory results in a
Heads “observation”. Thus only one Short microhypoth-
esis survives compared to both of Long’s.
The indication paradox is that any datum about the
false coin flip favors the Long run. It is analogous to
asserting that since your existence is the result of innu-
merable unlikely factors, the Universe is surely very large
given that you as a specific individual do in fact exist.
B. Revising FGAI to confront the paradox
This is the fundamental issue: how should we calculate
likelihoods when we don’t even know who or where we
are? When discussing Naive FGAI, there was a symme-
try between the observers being considered in that all of
them genuinely had equal probabilities distributions for
observed outcomes. But in cases like SB-B and SB-B′,
otherwise identical observers at different locations neces-
sarily observe different outcomes. There is no symmetry
to exploit. Naive FGAI simply used the maximum like-
lihood among all possible observers, but this is not the
only possible solution. The results of applying other for-
mulations of FGAI to SB-B′ are illustrated in Figure 5.
Implicit FGAI – The solution closest to Naive FGAI is
labeled Implicit FGAI, because we reject the formulation
of SB-B′ and adopt an implicit coordinate system refer-
ring to “today” and “the other day”. We then fine-grain
according to mixings of the pure Strategies A and B: we
instead consider Strategies A′ and B′. In Strategy A′,
the experimenters tell us the coin lands Heads today and
Tails on the “other day” if we awaken on “the other day”;
in Strategy B′, the outcomes of A′ are flipped. In this
situation, a Heads “observation” today rules out both
B′ microhypotheses, preventing an indication effect. A
further observation that “today is Monday” is treated
as purely indexical, with no relevance for our physical
credences.
We can use the symmetry to perform a “coordinate
transformation” between strategies referring to external
labels and strategies referring to our labels. In this
case, the symmetry is restored in the participant-centric
coordinates, but this is not generally possible – if our
friend told us at the start the experimenters had de-
cided on Strategy A, there would be only one allowed
microhypothesis in Short, but two in Long, leading to a
Doomsday-like effect. Without this symmetry, implicit
FGAI does not let us translate predictions from one in-
dexical system to another, severely limiting its use. La-
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FIG. 5. The indication paradox of SB-B′, and how it is treated with different modifications of FGAI. Each box, representing
the credence in a microhypothesis, lists the observed outcomes, ordered by index in the used coordinate system. An underlined,
bold outcome is treated as the one the observer measures for the purposes of calculating likelihoods. In the Weighted FGAI
treatment, the normalized weights applied to each microhypotheses are given to the left of each provisional physical credence.
bels like “Monday” or “Tuesday” are meaningless until
one can connect them to the implicit coordinate system,
propositions like “Strategy A is adopted” or “Strategy
B is adopted” lack the referents to connect them to ob-
servations. Because of this inability, Implicit FGAI is
inadequate.
SSA+FGAI: Doomsday without solipsism? – A more
radical solution is to reintroduce the SSA: instead of ap-
plying the maximum possible likelihood for an outcome
among all observers we might be, we applying the mean





















Then, in SB-B′, the result of the “coin flip” does not
affect our credences in Short and Long. Both micro-
hypotheses of Long would survive the observation, but
they would be penalized by a 1/2 factor because only
one in two participants is given a Heads outcome. But
this penalty continues to apply even when it is no longer
needed: when we now apply the observation that “today
is Monday” (and thus Strategy A was adopted) to the
resulting distribution, Short is now favored two to one.
Although the SSA+FGAI provides a route for the
Doomsday Argument in FGAI, this may not be as bad
as it seems. The fine-graining “tames” the unrestricted
SSA’s solipsistic tendencies in many cases, when there is
no “ranking”: note that in SB-B′, we disfavor the Long
hypothesis only after we learn it is the first day of the
experiment. The frustration of solipsism is illustrated by
a minimal model in which we consider possible extant
observers A and B, with a Small world theory that only
one of them exists and a Large world theory where both
exist. In the Small world model, the two microhypothe-
ses are only A existing and only B existing. But in the
Large world model, because there is no ordering, there is
only one microhypothesis: both A and B exist. Thus, A’s
self-observation allows one of two Small microhypothesis
with its full weight and the sole Large microhypothesis
with just half weight to survive, leaving Small and Large
with equal credence. No further data is possible, and
thus Small and Large remain in equal standing.
This is the crucial difference between the Dooms-
day Argument and the other solipsistic arguments that
SSA+FGAI exploits. When considering x-day Argu-
20
ments, it is impossible for observers with high Nx to ex-
ist without observers with low Nx also existing. It would
be like if the Small world model only had the microhy-
pothesis that A exists. When considering other solipsis-
tic thought experiments, we can include hypotheses that
only observers unlike us exist in our Small theory prior –
microhypotheses where only fish are conscious instead of
humans, or only Jupiter is inhabited instead of Earth.27
Indeed, we must include them to avoid solipsism, al-
though these possibilities usually are not included when
“Copernican” arguments are made.28 Even Doomsday
itself may be neutralized in the KSO model if we apply
the SSA to the narrow reference class of observers iden-
tical to ourselves: every microhypothesis where we exist
has us living in 2021.
Despite being “tamer” than unrestricted SSA,
SSA+FGAI is unsatisfactory both in that it allows (po-
tentially unrealistically powerful) Doomsday Arguments
at all and because it never “forgives” the penalties it
imposes. Recall, the 1/2 factor applied to Long’s likeli-
hood in SB-B′ arose from the fact that you could plau-
sibly either be awake then on Monday or Tuesday. Be-
cause of your indexical uncertainty, you had no way to
assign one value to the likelihood, and the SSA’s pur-
pose was to provide it in the face of this ambiguity. That
circumstance no longer applies if you then learn “today
is Monday” and the indexical uncertainty is eliminated,
but there is no way to undo the SSA. Essentially, this re-
sults in SSA+FGAI double-counting the evidence against
Large theories: penalizing all the microhypotheses be-
cause we do not know who we are, and then penalizing
some of the microhypotheses because we do know who
we are. In contrast, if you had learned “today is Mon-
day” first, then you would have had enough indexical
information to calculate a single likelihood for each mi-
crohypothesis. SSA+FGAI is unsatisfactory because it
either reaches different conclusions based on which or-
der data is learned, or it demands the widest possible
reference class always be used no matter what we learn.
Rebooted SSA+FGAI – “Rebooted SSA+FGAI” is
a modification of SSA+FGAI to eliminate the order-
dependence of learning data. It is like SSA+FGAI, ex-
cept that the credence distribution is reset to the origi-
nal prior whenever new indexical information is learned.
Then, all physical and indexical data is re-applied simul-
taneously. The likelihood of microhypotheses are evalu-
ated according to the SSA applied only among observers
27 SSA+FGAI would neutralize some formulation of the “Cosmic
Doomsday” Argument – although it would “refute” our becom-
ing an interstellar society, it is perfectly consistent with elliptical
galaxy inhabitants, dark matter lifeforms, or aliens who evolve a
trillion years from now creating one.
28 A similar phenomenon occurs even in Weighted FGAI if we con-
sider two models with the same number of observers but with a
different number of possible outcomes, as in SB-C. This is the
Bayesian Occam’s Razor at work. In some cases, using the Naive
FGAI prior leads to an SIA-like effect favoring Large theories,
however (see Section VG).
with all your current indexical data. Essentially, with
each reboot, the reference class shrinks. The rebooting
undoes the penalty applied by the SSA.
C. Weighted FGAI
The most advanced of the FGAI frameworks is
Weighted FGAI. Like Rebooted SSA+FGAI, Weighted
FGAI effectively allows re-evaluation of likelihoods as
new indexical information is learned. It also provides
a more formal framework for keeping track of indexical
information.
Weighted FGAI’s premise is that there is no single
physical distribution for the microhypotheses. Instead,
every microhypothesis has many physical credences, one
for each possible observer location. These are the pro-
visional physical credences, each evaluated as if we were
certain that we were at its associated location. The set
of provisional physical credences is then bound by a set
of indexical weights, which is an indexical distribution
evaluated according to the indexical knowledge we have.
At any given time, we evaluate our credences in the var-
ious microhypotheses by averaging over the provisional
physical distributions using the indexical weights.29
In Weighted FGAI, we consider the set O, collecting
every possible observer-trajectory among all the micro-
hypotheses in each macrotheory. Within each macrothe-
ory τk, each possible observer-trajectory i we might be
located on has an indexical weight wk,i. In real experi-
ments, we may know enough to eliminate some possible
observer-trajectories, so these are excluded from O (e.g.,
we restrict O to humans). Note that all microhypotheses
in each macrotheory share these weights, but they are not
shared between macrotheories (see Section VE). Only
some subset Ok,j of O are possible observer-trajectories
in a given microhypothesis µk,j , and each µk,j has its own




the absence of any prior data or other constraints on un-
informative priors, the weights are initialized with an un-
informative distribution wpriork,i = 1. This is the effective
role of the SSA in Weighted FGAI – it is the principle
for choosing initial indexical weights.
The provisional physical credence pk,j,i is the cre-
dence in µk,j calculated by an observer along observer-
trajectory i ∈ Ok(D). They are not normalized, since
that would require the indexical weights that are calcu-
lated for other microhypotheses, and are not true prob-
ability distributions, although they are closely related to
29 To use a loose analogy, the combination of indexical weights and
provisional physical distributions can be compared to density
matrices in quantum mechanics. Density matrices are gener-
ally needed to describe the mixed state of a part of a system.
Metaphorically speaking, Weighted FGAI is needed when an ob-
server sees only a part of the consequences of a microhypothesis
and no single pure distribution can describe credences.
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actual physical credence distributions. Unless otherwise
required based on prior knowledge or to ensure an un-
informative credence distributions (Section VG), initial
prior credences at all observer-locations are assigned as
in Naive FGAI: ppriork,j,i = P
prior
k,j .
We update the provisional physical distributions when
observations when an observation give us data D. For
each microhypothesis, the observation model combined
with the assumption that we are the observer along tra-
jectory i yields a single likelihood for that data. The
provisional physical distributions are thus “updated” us-
ing these likelihoods, neglecting normalization: pposk,j,i =
ppriork,j,i × L(µk,j |o@i → D). As in Naive FGAI, the provi-
sional physical distributions are insulated from indexical
information.
The data may also yield indexical information – if we
learn “today is Monday”, “I am a human on Earth”, or
“my birthrank is 108 billion”, for example. The indexi-
cal weightings is updated independently according to the
probability we have data D if we are the observer along












In situations like SB-A when we already are certain of
the physical nature of the world, ppriork,j,i is nonzero only
for the known world model µk,j . In that case, w
pos
k,i is
an unnormalized indexical credence and equation 6 re-
duces to normal Bayesian updating. The Bayesian limit
more generally occurs if P (o@i → D|µk,j) is the same
for all remaining microhypotheses. Indexical data can be
neutral with respect to the different locations. In other
cases, we may learn exactly which observer we are (such
as “My birthrank is exactly 108 billion” in a Dooms-
day Argument), resulting in a nonzero weight for a single
observer-trajectory because the likelihoods for all others
are zero.
Our posterior credence in microhypothesis µk,j is then
generated from the provisional physical distributions by













































The posterior credence P posk of a macrotheory is once
again found by summing the credences of its microhy-
potheses. The use of the weights means that Weighted
FGAI is not a strictly Bayesian theory. We cannot cal-
culate the “actual” physical credence until we can assign
a single, unambiguous likelihood, and we cannot do this
in FGAI. Instead the posterior credence is a construction
built from possible physical credences using the indexical
weights.
Equation 7 can be viewed as Weighted FGAI’s ren-
dition of the Observer Equation proposed by Bostrom
[2]. It has several useful limits. First, if the likelihood
L(µk,j |o@i → D) is the same for all remaining possi-
ble observer trajectories i (W posk,i > 0) in each microhy-
pothesis, then this application reduces to Bayes’ formula
applied on the indexical weight-averaged prior probabili-
ties. In particular, in situations where indexical informa-
tion is entirely irrelevant, ppriork,j,i = P
prior
k,j and all indexical
dependence vanishes from equation 7. Second, suppose
the data D picks out a subset O′ ⊂ O possible observer-
trajectories, but is equally consistent with all of them.
Then, O′ is our location reference class, and equation 6
applied to equal prior weights yields an equal prior weight
for each element in O′. This amounts to an assertion
of the SSA applied to the narrowed reference class O′.
Equation 7 then implements SSA+FGAI (equation 5).
Of course, if we know our exact observer-trajectory, then
that trajectory’s indexical weight is 1, and we are left
with Bayes’ formula with likelihoods calculated using our
known location. Finally, if we are already certain that
µk,j is correct, then the prior provisional credences are
nonzero only for this microhypothesis, and equation 7
gives P posk,j = 1.
As required in FGAI, the indexical weights are entirely
separated from the (provisional) physical distributions,
albeit with a more active role than in Naive FGAI. The
weights shift adaptively in response to indexical data,
as we can more accurately assess likelihoods over mi-
crohypotheses. The novel feature of Weighted FGAI is
the shifting indexical weights’ ability to “revive” theories
that were provisionally disfavored by the SSA. This lets
us implement the “rebooting”, where we evaluate all the
likelihoods again with fresh indexical knowledge. If we
had only a single joint probability distribution, evidence
can only eat away the prior probability in a theory be-
cause likelihoods are always ≤ 1. The only way a theory
survives with a single credence distribution is if the other
theories’ prior credence is also consumed at a compara-
ble rate. In Weighted FGAI, the provisional probability
invested in disfavored observer trajectories is not lost but
re-assigned to the microhypotheses consistent with likely
observer trajectories.
This formulation of Weighted FGAI is based on the as-
sumption that there are only a finite number of locations
or trajectories, parameterized by a finite set of indexi-
cal weights. Infinite volumes are a common feature of
modern cosmologies, however. One way to address this
problem would be to replace the discrete distributions
with densities in a way that recovers conclusions found
for an arbitrarily large finite number of locations. An-
other is to note that the number of expected configura-
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tions of a Hubble volume is expected to be finite [e.g., 51].
The ultimate motivation for including the weights is that
likelihood calculations depend on observer-trajectory and
evolution. If two locations are located in two indistin-
guishable Hubble volumes, their likelihood calculations
should also be indistinguishable. Because the weights
would no longer refer to a single location with a unique
evolution, trouble could arise if all observations are be
explained away by “updating” to whichever unlikely se-
quence of Hubble volume configurations just happens to
fit the data. We might prevent this by allowing indexical
updates solely on information available in the past light
cone when observations begin. This would let us update
indexical information to account for our birthrank or our
location in a spiral galaxy, for example, without letting
us pretend that we just happen to be in the Hubble vol-
ume where all observed positrons have remained stable
despite having a half-life of a femtosecond.
D. What are the indexical weights?
The indexical weights probabilistically define our cur-
rent reference class, which evolves as we learn new infor-
mation. These weights are calculated using likelihoods
averaged over all microhypotheses. But who is doing the
observation along that trajectory depends on the micro-
hypothesis, just as who is born at birthrank 1 in the
Doomsday Argument varies. Thus the indexical weights
describe a reference class of locations or contexts (or
more properly, trajectories), not observers. The indexical
weights tell us where we are, not who we are.
Equation 6 includes a dependence on the prior physical
credence pprior. When normalized, the indexical weights
themselves form a joint physical-indexical probability dis-
tribution, even though weighted FGAI rejects such distri-
butions for the physical credence. Unlike previous joint
distributions, the indexical weights implement an inverse
SSA. Instead of evaluating physical hypotheses under the
assumption we are a typical observer, it evaluates indexi-
cal hypotheses under the assumption that a typical phys-
ical hypothesis within a macrotheory is true.
Indexical weights can also be viewed as a second-order
probability distribution over a series of trivial indexical
distributions. Srednicki and Hartle [32] first proposed
that we could test the correctness of various indexical
distributions called xerographical distributions by com-
paring their predictions in physical theories with our ev-
idence. A key difference with Srednicki and Hartle [32],
though, is that only an orthonormal set of xerographic
distributions, each implying absolute certainty in one’s
trajectory, is used in Weighted FGAI. 30
30 Friederich [31] noted that a xerographic distribution with
nonzero credence for multiple possible observers is nonetheless
consistent with learning our identity with certainty. That is be-
FIG. 6. Illustration of how using microhypothesis-level
weighting in SB-B′ results in the indication paradox where
any data about the “coin flip” automatically favors the Long
theory.
Unlike the attached indexical distributions of Sec-
tion III, the indexical weights are averaged over all possi-
ble microhypotheses. The indexical weights can be non-
zero for locations completely inconsistent with the data
– indeed, this is how Weighted FGAI is able to constrain
these microhypotheses at all. If we are just interested in
the indexical distribution for a single microhypothesis, it









k,j,zP (o@z → D|µk,j)
. (8)
One unresolved issue is what counts as a separate tra-
jectory. If the experimenters in SB-B′ assigned you to
room I if they chose Strategy A but room II if they chose
Strategy B, or if they put you in room I on the Heads day
and room II in the Tails day, different hypotheses about
strategies naively have their own indexical weights. This
leads to an SIA-like effect, even if the rooms are com-
pletely indistinguishable from your perspective (see also
Section VG). A deeper understanding of locations and
trajectories in Weighted FGAI is needed to resolve the
issue, however.
E. How should the indexical weights be linked?
According to equation 7, the weights are shared among
all microhypotheses and all macrotheories, but is this
necessary?
Perhaps the most natural solution would be to give
each microhypothesis its own set of weights, updated ac-
cording to equation 8. This scheme is invalid: the aver-
aging of the weights regulates how much each weight can
“adapt” to new data. Microhypothesis-level weights are
too sensitive – they find whichever observer happens to
have your data D and declare that you are that observer.
cause the likelihood of receiving that information is nonzero for
one of the observers, in turn yielding a nonzero likelihood for the
xerographic distribution as a whole. Thus, a xerographic distri-
bution expressing uncertainty survives learning perfect indexical
information. Weighted FGAI avoids this issue because indexical
locations themselves are weighted.
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In a large enough universe, there is likely to be some ob-
server at some location with your data D, and the result
is credence evaluation according to this optimal location,
resulting in a likelihood of 1. It would be like flipping
a coin a thousand times, always getting heads, and then
concluding that the coin is fair but you just happen to be
the fluke observer who will happen to observe a thousand
heads in a vast cosmos (c.f. Section IVE). Figure 6 illus-
trates what happens when microhypothesis-level weights
are used to resolve SB-B′: the observer automatically fa-
vors the Long theory upon learning the “result” is Heads
because a Heads observation is more likely to exist some-
where within the Long theory.
Another natural solution would be to share indexi-
cal weights between macrotheories. Indexical weights
would be updated as in equation 6 by averaging over
all possible microhypotheses in every macrotheory where
the observer-trajectory exists. When the probability of
an observer along trajectory i observing data D is in-
dependent of macrotheory, macrotheory-level weighting
gives the same results as universal weights. Universal
weights are problematic because the averaging depends
on macrotheory credences themselves. Suppose in SB-B,
we woke up and then learned the experimenters had cho-
sen to run the Long variant without learning what day it
was. With universal weights, we would update the Mon-
day weight to wM = 1/2, resulting in us favoring it being
Tuesday.
How weights are shared determines how “aggressive”
Weighted FGAI is in making conclusions. Imagine there
is an experiment with two indistinguishable participants
in two rooms, both of which contain a coin. The partici-
pants watch a coin flip and observe its results but are not
allowed to inspect the coins. In variant A of the experi-
ment, both coins are fair, but in version B, room I’s coin
always lands on Heads. Both variants are given equal
prior credence. The microhypotheses list the possible
outcomes of each coin flip in each variant. Not knowing
which room they are in (W priorI = W
prior
II = 1/2), one
participant observes their coin lands Heads. How should
the participant update the indexical weights?
If both variants A and B have their own weights,
then the participant may update their variant B weights
to WB,I = 2/3 and WB,II = 1/3, while the variant
A weights are unaffected. Then the participant eval-
uates P pos(B) = 5/8. But if there is just one set of
weights for both A and B, they are instead updated
them to wI = 1/2 × (2/8 + 2/4) = 3/8 and wII =
1/2×(2/8+1/4) = 2/8. The resulting evaluated credence
in variant B is P pos(B) = (3/5×2/4+2/5×1/4)/[(3/5×
2/8+2/5×2/8)+(3/5×2/4+2/5×1/4)] = 8/13. Linking
the weights on the macrotheory-scale results in a faster
convergence to the belief that one is in room I and variant
B is being run.31
31 For comparison, the credence in variant B is only 4/7 if we
This remains another open issue in Weighted FGAI,
without an entirely clear justification for sharing weights
on the macrotheory-level aside from the fact that it gives
us the “right” answers.
F. Weighted FGAI and Sleeping Beauty
Weighted FGAI’s treatment of the Sleeping Beauty ex-
amples is illustrated in Figure 7. Because both the phys-
ical provisional distributions and indexical weights are
updated according to Bayes’ equation (as required by
Section III C), we can recover the naive Bayesian predic-
tions of SB-A and SB-C.
In the SB-B variant, there are only the Short and the
Long theories, with one trivial microhypothesis each, and
each having 1/2 prior credence. The Short theory has a
normalized indexical weighting of 1 for Monday. The
Long theory has a Monday provisional probability and a
Tuesday provisional probability, both still equal to 1/2.
The Long theory also has an indexical weighting of 1/2
for Monday and 1/2 for Tuesday. Now we learn “to-
day is Monday”. The likelihood that this observation is
made is 1 if we are the Monday observer so the Mon-
day provisional probabilities have a likelihood of 1. The
likelihood this observation is made is 0 if we are the Tues-
day observer, so the Tuesday provisional probability in
the Long theory is eliminated. However, the Long the-
ory gives us 100% confidence in our being the Monday
observer if today is Monday, and its indexical weights
shift to 1 for Monday and 0 for Tuesday. As a result,
the probability lost in the Tuesday provisional distribu-
tion is irrelevant. Our credence in the Long theory is
(1 × 1/2 + 0 × 0)/[(1 × 1/2) + (1 × 1/2 + 0 × 0)] = 1/2,
just as before.
The fine-grained perspective of FGAI and the use
of observer-trajectories actually lets us differentiate be-
tween Alice and Bob being created each day and Alice
and Bob being pre-existing observers. In the former, the
trajectories begin and end on the same day no matter
who awoke on Monday and who might be awake on Tues-
day. There are thus just two indexical weights, and both
describe valid locations in both Long microhypotheses.
Hence, Alice’s credence in Long upon awakening is 1/2
as in SB-B. But if Alice and Bob are pre-existing ob-
servers who remember their pre-experiment life, then the
trajectories are not the same. In the Alice-first Long mi-
crohypothesis, the Monday trajectory connects with Al-
ice’s Sunday location instead of Bob’s Sunday location.
There are thus four possible indexical weights, and each
microhypothesis is compatible with only some of them.
It can then be shown that Alice evaluates her credence
in Long as 2/3 upon awakening. This distinction is in
use microhypothesis-level weighting, 3/5 if we use uninforma-
tive weights, and as high as 2/3 if we are certain we are located
in room I.
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FIG. 7. Treatment of the fundamental variations of the Sleeping Beauty problem in Weighted FGAI. In SB-A, only the
indexical weights shift, while in SB-C, the physical credence distributions entirely drive the conclusion. In SB-B, the indexical
information shifts the indexical weights assigned to each provisional distribution, ensuring that neither the Short nor Long
distributions are favored.
line with the intuition provided in the beginning of the
section.
G. Paradoxical SIA-like effects in Weighted FGAI?
Unfortunately, while Weighted FGAI evades some
paradoxical indication effects, like those arising in SB-
B′, it still results in favoring Large hypotheses under
other circumstances. Suppose we were participating in
this modification of SB-B:
(SB-B′′) You wake up in the room. The experi-
menters tell you they are running SB-B, but if the
run is Short, they then decide whether to wake you
on Monday or Tuesday. Either possibility is equally
likely from your perspective. The experimenters
then truthfully inform you it is Monday. How does
that affect your credence in a Short or Long run?
As illustrated in Figure 8, learning that it is Monday re-
sults in you favoring the Long variant because it is then
more likely that an observation will be made on Monday.
Just like SB-B′, the paradox arises because any data re-
sults in you favoring the Long variant; you would reach
the same conclusion if you were instead told it was Tues-
day.
SB-B′′ is not simply an isolated thought experiment
with no connection to the real world. It models cases
where we want to constrain non-humanlike intelligences
like those living around red dwarfs or elsewhere in a land-
scape, starting from a state of no knowledge. It is unclear
how Weighted FGAI should be modified to prevent this
conclusion without opening it back up to Doomsday-like
effects. SSA+FGAI avoids the problem at the cost of
favoring Small models under other circumstances.32 A
modification to the priors that lets each Small microhy-
pothesis inherit the full macrotheory credence in different
provisional distributions, trading pprior and w, does not
have this problem (Figure 8, bottom). This would let us
construct the provisional prior credences from the unin-
formative distribution we would adopt if we knew our in-
dexical location. Defining the rules for which provisional
priors and weights should be used, and their motivations,
remain an issue for Weighted FGAI.
32 Arguably, in many real-world analogs of SB-B′′ we already know
our location and are just considering theories where additional
observers are added on; since the non-Earthly locations have
indexical weights of 0, our credences should be unaffected by
the self-observation. Yet one could imagine situations where we
do not start out knowing our environment. For example, if we
are trying to determine how sensitively life depends on a poorly
constrained physical constant [c.f., 3].
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FIG. 8. Illustration of a second indication paradox resulting from SB-B′′, where the day we wake up in the Short variant is
unknown. Whether we are told it is Monday or Tuesday, we favor the conclusion we are in the Long experiment (top). A
modification of Weighted FGAI where both Short microhypotheses inherit the full prior credence but are weighted would evade
the paradox (bottom).
H. Counterintuitive results with unreliable
measurements?
In the examples I’ve considered, the indexical measure-
ments have been assumed to be perfectly reliable, giving
likelihoods of either 0 or 1 for allowed sets of locations.
This has led to the conclusion that credence in a theory
does not depend on how big it is. Actually, if the index-
ical measurements are unreliable, we do find Doomsday-
like effects in Weighted FGAI for certain scenarios.
Suppose in SB-B, we know the experimenters are de-
vious when they announce what day it is. If it is a Short
experiment, then they will (correctly) tell us it is Mon-
day. In a Long experiment, however, they will tell us the
correct day only p of the time and give us a wrong day
with probability 1 − p. The Long theory thus has four
microhypotheses about what days they will announce33.
When we hear the experimenters announce that today
is Monday, our Long indexical weights update to p for
Monday and 1−p for Tuesday, but the provisional distri-
butions also update. Then Weighted FGAI implies our
credence in the Long theory is 1− [2(p2−p+1)]−1, reach-
ing a minimum of 1/3 for p = 1/2.
The decreased credence in Long is not necessarily a
flaw. Arguably, if p = 1/2, the announcement effectively
acts like a randomized measurement in the Long the-
ory but deterministic in a Short theory, so maybe we
should accept the lower odds. At the same time, we may
worry that we are “double-dipping” by updating both
the indexical distribution and the provisional distribu-
tions. This has not been a problem before since in previ-
ous scenarios the likelihoods have been either 0 or 1, so
squaring the likelihoods does not matter. Not updating
33 True Monday+false Monday (p(1 − p) of the time), true Mon-
day+true Tuesday (p2), false Tuesday+false Monday ((1− p)2),
and false Tuesday+true Tuesday (p(1− p)).
the indexical weights always leads to P posL = 1/3 upon
being told it is Monday, however, even if p is 0 or 1.
I. Self-applied x-day Arguments in Weighted FGAI
If we accept Weighted FGAI as a theory of typical-
ity, we can easily treat self-applied x-day Arguments
using the fine-grainings of Section IVF1. Each Ntotal
macrotheory has its own set of indexical weights. In
the single world versions, the observer-trajectories for
these indexical weights are simply each possible x-rank
0 to Ntotal − 1. In multiple world versions, there is
an observer-trajectory for each x-rank and each world.
These weights are initialized to be equal for each pos-
sible observer-trajectory. Every human can learn their
x-rank but not which of the worlds they live in.
The single-world IO case is equivalent to SB-B: learn-
ing one has an x-rank of 1 shifts the indexical weights in
the Long theory and the credences do not change. In a
many world case where all worlds have the same Ntotal,
there is uncertainty about which world one is in, but
the symmetry results in the same conclusion. If there
are many worlds and we consider theories where Ntotal
is assigned randomly, we get a series of microhypotheses
about which worlds are Small and which Large. A self-
observed x-rank of 1 zeroes out the indexical weights for
all positions with Nx > 1 in every world, inhibiting the
Doomsday Argument just as for the single-world case.
For UO and USO, Weighted FGAI prevents the con-
clusion that we live in a long history simply because any
specific individual is more likely to be born. The indexi-
cal weights are initialized evenly for all observers, and the
observation of one’s existence provides no indexical in-
formation to change that. Thus, although the amount of
prior credence that survives the self-observation is greater
by Ntotal in a single world, it is weighted by a factor of
1/Ntotal, as only that fraction of individuals has that spe-
cific self-data. Upon learning your x-rank, large Ntotal
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FIG. 9. Illustration of how a self-applied Doomsday Argu-
ment fails in the KSO schema according to Weighted FGAI.
Two models are compared, with NS = 1, NL = 2, H1 =
{A1, B1}, and H2 = {A2, B2}. The combinatorial proper-
ties of the microhypotheses, aided by the shifting indexical
weights, ensure the prior is unaffected by an observer learn-
ing they are A1 at rank 1.
theories are penalized by having fewer microhypotheses
survive, but this is compensated by the indexical weights
shifting to locate you at your actual x-rank. Thus you
can conclude nothing from the self-applied x-day Argu-
ment. A worked example is given in Appendix B.
KSO proceeds more simply because learning your indi-
vidual identity also allows one to assign your x-rank with
certainty in all microhypotheses. The self-observation
eliminates the same fraction of prior weight in all theo-
ries for observers with your x-rank (Figure 9). The self-
applied x-day Argument is again rendered powerless.
Weighted FGAI, with its emphasis on observations as
physical events, requires exactly specified (if simplified)
models instead of simply relying on analogies. Purely in-
dexical problems, like SB-A or Leslie’s “emerald” thought
experiment, do not accurately model the Doomsday Ar-
gument. Nor do purely physical problems like SB-C,
urn problems, or the external Doomsday Argument (Fig-
ure 7). It is now clear why the self-applied Doomsday
Argument never yields new information within Weighted
FGAI:
• Indexical facts do not directly constrain physical
distributions – The separation between indexi-
cal and physical distributions in Weighted FGAI
shrinks reference class, retroactively shrinking the
power of the 1/Ntotal likelihoods, averting solip-
sism.penalizing theories
• Large worlds have more positions for specific in-
dividuals to be born, balanced by the uninforma-
tive weights – In UO and USO, a greater frac-
tion of physical microhypotheses is consistent with
the existence of any specific individual in a Large
world. Yet the smaller weights accorded to each
position prevent any “Presumptuous Philosopher”
problems.
• Physical observations obey causality, limiting out-
comes – KSO provides an explicit model where one
cannot treat the birthrank of yourself, a specific
individual, as a uniform random variable. Physi-
cal distributions in themselves are updated solely
by physical observations, which are constrained by
causality. If an individual like you can only be born
at birthrank 1011, there is only one possible out-
come, with likelihood 1.
The rejection of the Doomsday Argument itself does not
negate the many potential threats to ourselves and the
Earth that we know about, especially when considering
anthropic effects [1, 52]. Evaluating these threats could
itself shift our beliefs to a short future, but this must
be done through normal scientific investigation of their
natures.
J. Boltzmann Brains in Weighted FGAI
Cosmological theories with large thermal baths – in-
cluding the event horizons of black holes and de Sitter
universes – predict the appearance of Boltzmann brains,
observers with your memories and beliefs that assem-
ble out of thermal fluctuations and flicker into activity
briefly [e.g., 53–55]. Not only are they predicted to exist
with probability 1, but current cosmological theories have
the disturbing tendency to predict that Boltzmann brains
with your memories vastly outnumber those of you who
have evolved naturally. The first epistemic issue they
raise is that Boltzmann brains cannot justifiably use their
data as evidence, even if the data favors the true nature
of their world. The second problem deals with our abil-
ity to draw physical inferences. Even in universes very
unlike ours, there should be observers with our memo-
ries who remember our ΛCDM cosmology. The “real”
laws of physics do not have to support entire stars and
planets for this to happen; they merely have to support
cognition long enough to “remember” observing our (pre-
sumed) world.
The Boltzmann brain problem motivated Bostrom [8]
to introduce the SSA and argue for the use of a wider ref-
erence class than observers identical to us. The vast ma-
jority of Boltzmann brains have experiences completely
unlike ours; even those that momentarily have our memo-
ries almost always find their sensoria dissolving immedi-
ately afterwards as they are exposed to their environ-
ment. The fraction who are long-lived is vanishingly
small (say, ≪ e−10
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). We might hope to exploit the
fact that the observed world does not dissipate to favor
our being evolved observers viewing the true Universe. In
the strictest interpretation of FGAI, this is of no help for
inference because there always exist Boltzmann brains
that observe a persisting universe (living on Boltzmann
Earths, for example).34
34 In landscape theories, an infinite multiverse realizes all possible
parameters for the laws of physics, and scientific questions about
27
FIG. 10. Minimal example of Boltzmann brain problem
treated in Weighted FGAI. Both the false and true cosmolo-
gies have two Boltzmann observers identical to ourselves; in
this case, each with an equal probability of being long-lived
(ℓ) and decaying in a short time (s). The true cosmology
also has an evolved observer E that always observes it cor-
rectly. An observation of T leaves the E provisional physical
distribution untouched and also shifts indexical weight to E,
favoring T.
Let us now apply Weighted FGAI to a simplified Boltz-
mann brain problem. In false cosmologies, only the
Boltzmann brains exist, while the true cosmology also
contains evolved brains. We start with a set of indexi-
cal weights assigning equal credence to each possible ob-
server, Boltzmann or evolved. Every evolved observer
sees a persistent universe, but only a small fraction η of
the Boltzmann brains observes one. As the observed cos-
mology persists in our sensory data, we update both our
indexical distributions and each cosmology’s provisional
physical credence. Then we will find ourselves both favor-
ing the true cosmology and our being an evolved observer
within that cosmology.
For example, suppose we consider two cosmologies, a
False one (F) and a True (T) one. The False one contains
only NBF Boltzmann brains, while the True one contains
NBT Boltzmann brains and NE evolved observers. We
have some coordinate system that separates the evolved
and Boltzmann brains, a very plausible assumption be-
cause Boltzmann brains are almost all found in the vastly
distant future. Each cosmology has 2NB microhypotheses
describing which of the Boltzmann brains are long-lived.
All the indexical weights start equal, wi = 1.
35
these laws are actually questions of which patch of the landscape
we inhabit. This is a purely indexical problem like SB-A. The
ultimate example is modal realism as advocated by David Lewis,
in which all possible things exist [56]. Nonetheless, we still need
some way to judge the relative merits of these theories with non-
landscape theories.
35 Actually, both NB and NE can be infinite, and even if we restrict
ourselves to finite volumes, they are unknown (and probably in-
deterministic) variables. Even ignoring these cavaets, one may
wonder if this higher-level weighting is appropriate: wouldn’t
the circumstances that lead to a long-lived Boltzmann brain di-
verge enough to merit a different weight? However, Boltzmann
Our not instantly dissipating is certain if we are
evolved observers but unlikely if we are Boltzmann
brains. Thus, the indexical weight for any evolved in-
dividual location remains 1, while the indexical weight
for any Boltzmann individual location updates to η. If
we are an evolved individual, all microhypotheses survive
the observation, while if we are any given Boltzmann in-
dividual, only η2NB do. Using equation 7, we now eval-




NE + ηNE + 2η2NBT
. (9)
As long as η ≪ 1 and NE ≫ η2NBT , we now almost
entirely favor cosmology T (P posT ≈ 1− η − η
2NBT /NE)
(see Figure 10 for a minimal example).36
In the above example, we consider only observers with
exactly our memories at the start of the observation [as in
6]. There are two reasons this is allowed despite Bostrom
[2]’s objections. First, the indexical weights are averaged
instead of being defined on the microhypothesis level,
and they describe a location reference class instead of
an observer reference class. This lets the vast major-
ity of Boltzmann brains that later experience a dissipat-
ing universe to influence the final credence: although a
given microhypothesis has some locations with long-lived
Boltzmann brains, these are no more favored than loca-
tions with dissipating Boltzmann brains. Second, unlike
the SSA, Weighted FGAI results in an uneven index-
ical distribution: we place much more weight in each
evolved brain location than the Boltzmann brain loca-
tions. This actually results in a faster convergence to the
realism of the T cosmology than the SSA, requiring only
η ≪
√
NE/NBT instead ofNE/NBT , although this is still
nowhere near quickly enough to resolve the Boltzmann
brain problem [53].37
brains should be mostly generated by Hawking radiation, a ran-
dom quantum process. Every location around every event hori-
zon where this happens has the same probability of generating
a longer-lived Boltzmann brain (subject only to size limitations
for black holes). That is, almost any particular Boltzmann brain
really could be a long-lived one, and we might treat this obser-
vation like any other quantum experiment.
36 A further cosmological problem is that evolved brains, who are
born of an entire low-entropy Universe, may be so outnumbered
by Boltzmann brains with our exact memories that they have
negligible effect on the credences [53]. If 2η2NBT ≫ NE , P
pos ≈
(1/2)[1 + NE(1 − η)/(2η
2NBT )] ≈ 1/2. The measure problem
is the lack of consensus on how these probabilities should be
calculated in multiverses [e.g., 9, 57].
37 A more fundamental issue for all theories of observation is that
our memories of even a few moments ago are probably unre-
liable if we are Boltzmann brains. The observation that the
world around us has not decayed in the past minute assumes
that we actually did perceive the world a minute ago, but Boltz-
mann brains who “remember” this observation may outnumber
the evolved observers [55]. The implication is that we should re-
set our cosmological priors every moment. All we can say is that
if some distribution, apparently dating back to some past date,
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. Summary of Weighted FGAI
I have developedWeighted FGAI as a framework for in-
terpreting typicality arguments. It shares elements with
other frameworks: the auxiliary information about ref-
erence classes in Bostrom [2], the use of extremely fine-
grained data about observers in Neal [6], and the sep-
arately updated indexical distributions of Srednicki and
Hartle [32]. It is based on two principles.
The first principle I have argued is that purely index-
ical facts cannot directly alter physical credence distri-
butions. Indexical facts and physical facts are different
types of data, and mixing them together into a joint prior
leads to “Presumptuous Philosopher” problems, biasing
us towards Large worlds or Small worlds. The difference
between indexicals and physical facts is elaborated by
different variants of the Sleeping Beauty thought exper-
iment, where the probability refers to different distribu-
tions. Yet both types of distributions always exist, even
when perfect knowledge about the world or our location
in it hides one.
The second principle is that high-level macrotheories
about the world can be resolved into a multitude of
physically-distinct microhypotheses. The consistency of
evidence with each microhypothesis is calculated through
physical distributions. In Weighted FGAI, we do not nec-
essarily know which observer we are, so there are provi-
sional physical distributions for every possible trajectory
we could be located along in a theory. These are aver-
aged by the indexical weights, summarizing our current
beliefs about our location. By defining reference classes
by location rather than observer, observations in a large
universe can nonetheless be constraining. Although up-
dated separately, they are combined together to form a
single physical credence and single indexical distribution
for each microhypothesis. Our third-person credence in
a macrotheory is then found by summing over all micro-
hypotheses.
I have showed how Weighted FGAI handles sev-
eral problems involving “typicality”, avoiding fallacious
Doomsday Arguments. Several issues remain. First, it
is not immune to Bayesian shifts favoring Large theo-
ries (for example, constraining observers in non-Earthlike
environments without ranking), although it does prop-
erly handle some situations where Naive FGAI fails.
This alone suggests a still more robust theory of typ-
icality is necessary, perhaps involving revising the pri-
ors by trading physical credence with indexical weights
(Section VG). Further issues stem from the need to
understand how indexical information is defined and
is valid, it is updated to another distribution given our current
observations. Perhaps Benétreau-Dupin [29]’s notion of a con-
tinuum of priors could be adapted for this problem, one each for
a possible epoch for which our memories are reliable.
handled. In particular, the indexical weights must be
shared between multiple microhypotheses, nominally on
the macrotheory level (Section VE). What exactly counts
as indexical information, and what to do when it is am-
biguous, may also be problematic. Likewise, it is not en-
tirely clear how to tell when trajectories require separate
weights. Finally, the formulation in this paper assumes a
finite number of possible observer locations. Nonetheless,
it has several desirable properties: it reduces to simple
Bayesian updating when either indexical or physical data
is fixed, and it can converge to realism faster than the
SSA when considering Boltzmann brains.
B. The role of the Copernican Principle in
Weighted FGAI
The Copernican insight that we are not unique mira-
cles is deeply ingrained, but not all applications of the
idea that “we are typical” are defensible. The parable
of the Noonday Argument describes a fallacious appli-
cation of the principle, demonstrating the problem with
the frequentist Doomsday Argument or trying to pick
out “special” points of history like its beginning. Other
Copernican arguments can have more subtle flaws.
Bayesian typicality arguments rely on 1/Ntotal likeli-
hoods: the more possible outcomes there are, the less
likely any specific one is observed. Although valid in
some circumstances, applying it to rule out Large theo-
ries is unacceptable – it can lead to solipsism, in which
you are the most typical being because you are the only
being. Whereas the Copernican principle motivates us to
consider the possibilities of a cosmos where we are living
in but one world of many, unrestricted application leads
to an epistemic arrogance where you decide your world
is the only kind of thing that exists. Yet the mere exis-
tence of the environments unlike ours already invalidates
the strongest formulations of the Copernican argument:
we are either atypical because we are not the only ob-
servers that exist, or we live in an atypical place because
it contains observers unlike everywhere else in the Uni-
verse.
Weighted FGAI is my attempt to deal with how to
make inferences in a vast cosmos, and it provides two
manifestations of the Copernican Principle. First is an
indexical role as a prior, choosing the initial indexical
weights by assigning equal weight to each possible po-
sition. This role is not trivial because the indexical
weights are shared between microhypotheses, which pe-
nalizes theories where our location is both rare and ran-
dom. Yet these indexical weights do not directly affect
our credences in physical theories.
The second manifestation of the Copernican Princi-
ple is embodied by our physical distributions. Weighted
FGAI fine-grains physical theories into microhypotheses
describing the exact physical details of every possible
outcome. These microhypotheses make no reference to
indexical notions like “me” or “us”, only specific physi-
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cal observers who make specific physical observations at
specific physical positions. Observer-relative typicality
emerges from the combinatorial properties of these mi-
crohypotheses when there is symmetry with respect to
position. In other cases, when specific individuals can
only exist in certain locations, typicality can fail – this
is the anthropic principle at work. Ultimately, the rea-
son why we may often assume ourselves to be typical is
because of the uniformity of the physical laws of the cos-
mos, manifesting both in the symmetry and the panoply
of microhypotheses.
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Appendix A: Explicit urn problem in FGAI
To demonstrate how FGAI can work in practice for
most normal kinds of observations, here is an explicit
treatment of an urn problem, using a smaller number of
participants and balls for compactness.
Say we have two unlabeled urns, U1 and U2. U1 con-
tains one ball, labeled B1. U2 contains two balls, labeled
B1 and B2. The B1 balls in U1 and U2 are indistin-
guishable. Four participants in the experiment are each
trying to determine whether the urn is U1 and U2 by
drawing a ball (with replacement) and seeing which one
it is, but they are not allowed to communicate with each
other. The four participants are distinct from each other
and named α, β, γ, and δ, although they may not be
aware of it. Each ball in the urn is equally likely to be
drawn. All four participants think it equally plausible
that the urn is U1 or U2, so they assign prior credences
of P prior(U1) = P
prior(U2) = 1/2. Suppose α draws B1.
How should B1 update their credences?
If we simply applied the SSA, we would reason that
the typical participant draws B1 with probability 1 from
U1 and 1/2 from U2. Thus their credence in U1 should
be updated to P pos(U1) = (1× 1/2)/[(1× 1/2) + (1/2×
1/2)] = 2/3.
In a full FGAI treatment, we list every possible mi-
crohypothesis and construct an observation model that
lists all possible observations each observer can make,
shown in Table II. Each microhypothesis in this case
inherits the same fraction of its parent macrotheory’s
weight, determined by the number of microhypotheses in
the macrotheory. With four participants, we may assume
that there is some indexing (coordinate) system assigning
each of α, β, γ, and δ to the positions I, II, III, and IV,
respectively, perhaps based on the order they make their
draws or their proximity to α. In this table, a state-
ment of the form {o@X, ω} → By is shorthand for the
propositions that an observer o at position X observes
By as their drawn ball (o@X → By) and that observer ω
observes By (ω → By) as their drawn ball.
In Weighted FGAI, we need a set of indexical
weights, one for each position. The coordinate sys-
tem described in the setup of the problem places
α at position I, and α knows this, so the weights
are (Wk,I,Wk,II,Wk,III,Wk,IV) = (1, 0, 0, 0) in each
macrotheory. Knowing they are at position I, they evalu-
ate likelihoods according to the fact that o@I → B1. The
normalized weights are never changed. Applying equa-
tion 7, α finds P pos(U1) = {(1×3/4)×[1×(1×1/2)]}{(1×
3/4)×[1×(1×1/2)]+(1×3/4)×[8×(1×1/32)]}= 2/3, the
correct result. This result is also found in Naive FGAI.
But what if α does not know they are α, only that
they are one of the four participants? Obviously, we
can index the participants I, II, III, and IV, but sup-
pose α refuses to work with an implicit indexing sys-
tem by assigning themself location I and wants to re-
main agnostic about which “position” they are in? Then
α can still proceed with the uninformative, SSA indexi-
cal weights (wk,I, wk,II, wk,III, wk,IV) = (1, 1, 1, 1). Upon
drawing a heads, the indexical weights remain unin-
formative. Applying equation 7, α finds P pos(U1) =
{(4× 3/4)× [1× (1×1/2)]}/{(4×3/4)× [1× (1×1/2)]+
(4 × 3/4) × [8 × (1 × 1/32)]} = 23 . Figure 11 illustrates
how the provisional physical distributions for the micro-
hypotheses update. The same result is found in Naive
FGAI.
Note that if every single microhypothesis got its own
set of indexical weights, updated by each observation,
then the weights of each would shift to accommodate
the B1 observation. As in the strictest interpretation of
Naive FGAI, the derived P pos(U1) would then be 16/31.
Appendix B: Explicit Doomsday problem in
Weighted FGAI
In this section, I work out an explicit example of a
Doomsday-type problem in Weighted FGAI. Although
extremely simple, it nonetheless illustrates several points:
Doomsday failing for internal observers while working for
an external observer, how to handle multiple “worlds” of
humanity, and how to treat hierarchical models in USO
with unequal prior credence in the microhypotheses.
The model consists of two “worlds”, indexed I and
II based on some otherwise unknown distinction. Each
world contains a short sequence of human observers. In
the Small model, Ntotal = 1 for both, while in the Large
model, Ntotal = 2 for both. These humans are drawn
from two subsets, Ha = {Aa} and Hb = {Ab, Bb}, of
unequal size. This is a USO model: due to unknown his-
torical contingencies, Ha humans can only be born at one
of birthrank 1 or 2 which is the same for all worlds, and
likewise for Hb. In addition, an external alien observer
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TABLE II. Microhypotheses for urn problem
Urn µ Observation model P prior Observation Likelihoods maxL(o → B1)
α → B1 o@I → B1 o@I → B2 o@I → B3 o@I → B4
1 B1B1B1B1
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 B1B1B1B1
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/32 1 1 1 1 1 1
B1B1B1B2
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B2]
1/32 1 1 1 1 0 1
B1B1B2B1
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B2, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/32 1 1 1 0 1 1
B1B1B2B2
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B2, {o@IV, δ} → B2]
1/32 1 1 1 0 0 1
B1B2B1B1
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B2,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/32 1 1 0 1 1 1
B1B2B1B2
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B2,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B2]
1/32 1 1 0 1 0 1
B1B2B2B1
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B2,
{o@III, γ} → B2, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/32 1 1 0 0 1 1
B1B2B2B2
[{o@I, α} → B1, {o@II, β} → B2,
{o@III, γ} → B2, {o@IV, δ} → B2]
1/32 1 1 0 0 0 1
B2B1B1B1
[{o@I, α} → B2, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/32 0 0 1 1 1 1
B2B1B1B2
[{o@I, α} → B2, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B2]
1/32 0 0 1 1 0 1
B2B1B2B1
[{o@I, α} → B2, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B2, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/32 0 0 1 0 1 1
B2B1B2B2
[{o@I, α} → B2, {o@II, β} → B1,
{o@III, γ} → B2, {o@IV, δ} → B2]
1/32 0 0 1 0 0 1
B2B2B1B1
[{o@I, α} → B2, {o@II, β} → B2,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/32 0 0 0 1 1 1
B2B2B1B2
[{o@I, α} → B2, {o@II, β} → B2,
{o@III, γ} → B1, {o@IV, δ} → B2]
1/32 0 0 0 1 0 1
B2B2B2B1
[{o@I, α} → B2, {o@II, β} → B2,
{o@III, γ} → B2, {o@IV, δ} → B1]
1/32 0 0 0 0 1 1
B2B2B2B2
[{o@I, α} → B2, {o@II, β} → B2,
{o@III, γ} → B2, {o@IV, δ} → B2]
1/32 0 0 0 0 0 0
X who knows all this deliberately seeks out human-
ity, arriving at one of the two worlds, but not knowing
which or what time beforehand. Each human observes
which member of H ≡ Ha ∪ Hb they are and measures
their birthrank accurately, but cannot observe humans
at other birthranks or in the partner world. Likewise, if
X is present at that world and that time, they measure
which human is present and what their birthrank is.
The microhypotheses in this problem are listed in Ta-
ble III. These microhypotheses indicate the birthrank or-
der of Ha and Hb, the exact sequence of each world, and
the human observed by X , denoted by Y ✕. The arrival
of X is a physical event and thus different locations of X
are properly treated as physical microhypotheses. This
example is somewhat complicated becauseHa andHb are
different size. Thus permutations with only Hb are more
numerous than those with Ha. The correct approach is
to regard the ordering of a and b as intermediate-level
parameters: it is just as likely that Ha has rank 1 as Hb
has rank 1. Thus Small microhypotheses with only b hu-
mans have lower prior weight P prior than those with only
a humans for a balanced credence. In the Table, quanti-
ties referring to World I and World II are separated by
a vertical bar, while quantities referring to humans at
different birthranks within a world are separated by a
comma.
Internal observers – You are a human and you have
worked out this model exactly. You wish to use a Dooms-
day Argument by determining which human in H you
are and also your birthrank. To do this in Weighted
FGAI, you require indexical weights for the Small and
Large theories. Since you know you are human and
not the alien, you use the initial indexical weight vec-
tor (wL,I,1, wL,1,2|wL,II,1, wL,II,2) = (1, 1|1, 1) in the Long
theory and (wS,I,1|wS,II,1) = (1|1) in the Short theory.
Columns 5–8 give likelihoods that a human at each posi-
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FIG. 11. Illustration of the urn example in Weighted FGAI when α does not know their identity, which recovers the expected
credences.
tion will make a given observation.
Now suppose you observe that you are Aa. Half of
all microhypotheses are consistent with each position, so
the indexical weights update to (1/2, 1/2|1/2, 1/2) for the
Long theory and (1/2|1/2) for the Short theory. The
credence in the Small theory updates to (1/2×2/8+1/2×
2/8)/[(1/2×2/8+1/2×2/8)+(1/4×16/64+1/4×16/64+
1/4 × 16/64 + 1/4 × 16/64)] = 1/2 – unchanged from
before. Next, you happen to measure your birthrank to
be 1. In all microhypotheses in both theories, this is only
consistent with having a birthrank of 1, prompting an
update of the indexical weights to (1/2, 0|1/2, 0) in Long.
Using the likelihoods in the Table, the credence in the
Small theory updates to (1/2× 2/8+ 1/2× 2/8)/[(1/2×
2/8 + 1/2× 2/8) + (1/2 × 16/64 + 1/2× 16/64)] = 1/2.
The Doomsday Argument has failed for Aa because of
the shifting indexical weights (Figure 12).
The Doomsday Argument also fails for Ab (and Bb by
symmetry) if they attempt it. Upon discovering they are
Ab, each wk,i updates to 1/4 and the credence in the
Small theory remains unchanged: (1/2 × 4/32 + 1/2 ×
4/32)/[(1/2× 4/32 + 1/2× 4/32) + (1/4× 8/64 + 1/4×
8/64+1/4×8/64+1/4×8/64)] = 1/2. If Ab finds themself
at birthrank 1, the Large theory indexical weights again
shift to (1/4, 0|1/4, 0) in Long, and the credence in the
Small theory is (1/2× 4/32+1/2× 4/32)/[(1/2× 4/32+
1/2× 4/32) + (1/2× 8/64 + 1/2× 8/64)] = 1/2.
External observers – You are the alien observer and
you have worked out this model exactly. You wish to
use a Doomsday Argument based on your observations
of who is currently living and their birthrank. You are
the only external observer, although there are four pos-
sible locations: x(I, 1), x(I, 2), x(II, 1), and x(II, 2) (Fig-
ure 12). The different possible locations of X – a physical
distinction – also correspond to different groups of mi-
crohypotheses, each with only one valid indexical weight
(Figure 12). Because X ’s position has no effect on the
sequence of humans, there is a complete symmetry in the
prior provisional credences between all microhypotheses.
Columns 9–12 give likelihoods for the observations you
may make.
Suppose you observe Aa from Ha. This does not by
itself affect your credence in the Small theory: (2 × 1 ×
1/8)/[(2× 1 × 1/8) + (4 × 1 × 1/16)] = 1/2. But if you
measure Aa’s birthrank to be 1, that credence updates
to (2 × 1 × 1/8)/[(2× 1 × 1/8) + (2 × 1 × 1/16)] = 2/3.
The same results are found if you observe Ab at rank
1: first, a Small credence of (2 × 1 × 1/16)/[(2 × 1 ×
1/16)+ (4× 1× 1/32)] = 1/2 when you observe Ab, then
(2×1×1/16)/[(2×1×1/16)+(2×1×1/32)] = 2/3. For
you, the Doomsday Argument is validated by Weighted
FGAI.
The difference results from two factors. First, there
is an extra temporal degree of freedom for X ’s arrival.
Second, X ’s position is entirely fixed in each microhy-
pothesis – knowing they are the external observer, X
can predict exactly who they will observe simply based
on time of arrival, since the time of arrival is entirely a
physical statement. In contrast, there is no single “time
of observation” for the humans in Large model, since
one observes early and one observes late. For the in-
ternal case, all microhypotheses are present in the Long
provisional physical distributions, because there are ob-
servers at all locations. A priori, the internal observer
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TABLE III. Microhypotheses for two-world USO Doomsday problem
Ntotal Order µ P
prior Human observation likelihoods External observation likelihoods
o = Aa o = Aa@1 o = Ab o = Ab@1 Aa Aa@1 Ab Ab@1
1 a A✕a |Aa 1/8 (1|1) (1|1) (0|0) (0|0) 1 1 0 0
Aa|A✕a 1/8 (1|1) (1|1) (0|0) (0|0) 1 1 0 0
b A✕
b




1/32 (0|0) (0|0) (1|1) (1|1) 0 0 1 1
A✕
b




1/32 (0|0) (0|0) (1|0) (1|0) 0 0 0 0
B✕
b




1/32 (0|0) (0|0) (0|1) (0|1) 0 0 1 1
B✕
b




1/32 (0|0) (0|0) (0|0) (0|0) 0 0 0 0
2 ab A✕a , Ab|Aa, Ab 1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) 1 1 0 0
Aa, A✕b |Aa, Ab 1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 1 0
Aa, Ab|A
✕




1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 1 0
A✕a , Ab|Aa, Bb 1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 1|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 1 1 0 0
Aa, A✕b |Aa, Bb 1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 1|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 1 0
Aa, Ab|A
✕




1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 1|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 0 0
A✕a , Bb|Aa, Ab 1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) 1 1 0 0
Aa, B✕b |Aa, Ab 1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 0 0
Aa, Bb|A
✕




1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 1 0
A✕a , Bb|Aa, Bb 1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 1 1 0 0
Aa, B✕b |Aa, Bb 1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 0 0
Aa, Bb|A
✕




1/64 (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 0 0
ba A✕
b
, Aa|Ab, Aa 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) 0 0 1 1
Ab, A
✕




, Aa 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) 0 0 1 1
Ab, Aa|Ab, A
✕
a 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) (1, 0|1, 0) 1 0 0 0
A✕
b
, Aa|Bb, Aa 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|0, 0) 0 0 1 1
Ab, A
✕




, Aa 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|0, 0) 0 0 0 0
Ab, Aa|Bb, A
✕
a 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|0, 0) (1, 0|0, 0) 1 0 0 0
B✕
b
, Aa|Ab, Aa 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|1, 0) 0 0 0 0
Bb, A
✕




, Aa 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|1, 0) 0 0 1 1
Bb, Aa|Ab, A
✕
a 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|1, 0) (0, 0|1, 0) 1 0 0 0
B✕
b
, Aa|Bb, Aa 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 0 0
Bb, A
✕




, Aa 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 0 0 0 0
Bb, Aa|Bb, A
✕
a 1/64 (0, 1|0, 1) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) (0, 0|0, 0) 1 0 0 0
places equal provisional prior credence in the Short and
Long theories for the rank 1 positions. But in the ex-
ternal case, the rank 1 and rank 2 positions constrain
completely different Long microhypotheses, splitting the
Long prior credence between them. A priori, the external
observer places twice as much provisional prior credence
in Short than Long for the rank 1 positions. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 12.
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